Introduction

During the course of the eighteenth century, millions of people worldwide migrated from their homelands to other jurisdictions. Over a million Germans emigrated from their homes in western and central Europe, constituting the largest European migratory group moving to areas beyond their nations, or empires, of origin. The greatest number of these Germans travelled either to British North America or to Hungary, the two most successful areas in attracting migrants in the long eighteenth century. While a small body of recent historiography has looked into the issues of community and society among emigrants in their new lands, little work has been done on the ways in which European colonists were actually recruited for these new societies.

This paper investigates the activities of the agents who solicited and enticed, and subsequently trafficked in, colonists; seducers, advisers, exhorters and cajolers, colonist agents were responsible for the systematisation of migration in the eighteenth century, a process that had lasting effects on the large-scale migrations of the nineteenth century and thereafter. These agents were an important element in the process of European expansion, within and outside the European continent, and most significantly into the Atlantic world, and were the precursors of the later, more centralised approach to colonial settlement. The eighteenth century is thus seen as a crucial transition period in which the attitudes of European governments to the problem of populating their extra-territorial possessions were shaped partly by the consequences of agents’ actions and partly by the transformation in labour service contracts that emerged as a direct result of the competition for colonists in Europe. Were it not for the intra-European and transatlantic competition for colonial labour, and here specifically German labour, significant changes in the European labour market would not have taken place, nor would the state-sponsored systematic control of immigration have reached the levels it did by the end of the eighteenth century.
Competition for Colonists

At the core of this study lies a comparative approach, examining the actions of agents recruiting settlers for North America and Hungary and comparing the tactics these agents employed. These colonies existed in direct competition with each other; Pennsylvania, the better known, became a by-word for success, with Hungary becoming the Pennsylvania of the east.¹ Both destinations had indigenous claimants to the land, had other European resident dwellers, and skirted borders to perceived ‘other worlds’. Beyond the borders of these two colonies lay relatively unknown horizons: both the Turk and the Native American were compared and contrasted as outcast and exotic. German colonists then, in travelling to America and Hungary, were travelling to the borders of the known, civilized, world and their actions as colonists were seen to aid the expansion of that world. As frontier residents they formed bulwarks of Christianity against the Turk and the Native American, and more broadly against the French in North America and the Slavic and other peoples of southeastern Europe.

Germans did not engage in the colonial venture as a state enterprise, but rather they relied on the invitation and support of states and governments actively involved in the transportation and settlement of willing migrants. German migration in the eighteenth century would become the template for subsequent European emigration to North America. Becoming active in a market for human capital not of their making or design, they possessed what Adam Smith called the ‘general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange’, not alone labour, but information.² Benjamin Franklin described the Germans as too fond of their own language and manners and ‘generally disagreeable to an English Eye’. But he did not doubt their suitability as front-line colonists.³

Germans were often viewed as the vanguard of defence in colonial society, where protection against attack was very high on the list of concerns for those already settled. The notion of granting settlers favourable terms which might tempt them to remain after a period of tax-free residence and make them loyal and trustworthy crown subjects was more appealing than

having permanently to billet soldiers, at high costs and for an indefinite duration, along the frontier. This was a common practice and was paralleled in the settlement of Germans along the Military Frontier in southeastern Europe and in parts of British North America.

Britain and her colonies and a transformed Habsburg Empire in Europe were the inevitable winners by the end of the century in terms of attracting settlers to their colonies, but few would have believed this at the century’s commencement. While Britain was already an established naval power by 1700 and would be an empire with circum-global possessions by the end of the century, the expansionist ambitions of her regal peers in Central Europe did not result in any such advancement. The Habsburg Monarchy was faced with a quandary of government characteristic of many early modern continental European states. Unlike its neighbours to the west, the Austrian Habsburgs did not possess colonies in the Atlantic, Indian or Pacific Oceans, nor was it likely they ever would. The Habsburg age in the Atlantic had ended in 1700 and it was left to Charles VI, a dissatisfied Spaniard in Austria, to enact Reconquista practices in lands regained from the Ottoman Empire. The House of Habsburg continued to share a lengthy border with the Sublime Porte which in the early eighteenth century was entering a period of steady decline. So long the champion of Christian Europe, the Habsburg Monarchy remained constantly threatened by the actual and possible threat of Muslim attack. For other European states, the Ottomans remained a maritime nuisance and at worst an economic rival, but from the end of the sixteenth century were largely seen as of waning influence both at sea and on land. Not so for the House of Habsburg, however, for whom the southern frontier remained the last line of defence against the Turk. And Habsburg expansion, denied her in the west and the north by alliances and intrigues between fellow European powers, was prevented in the south and the east by the stubborn attacks and counter-attacks of the Turks.

Conscious that land regained in military successes from the Ottoman Empire would need to be absorbed into the Habsburg administrative system as speedily and efficiently as possible, civil and military administrators alike recognised the need to colonize these new territories with the greatest speed and by planting the most loyal subjects. Hungary, and particularly the Banat of Temesvár, was to be an experiment in colonial government of a type the Habsburg administration had not tried before. What began with the end of the siege of Vienna in 1683 would continue until 1780; a process of expansion not limited to extra-European activities, but
operated within the continent, too. Colonization and expansion within continental Europe were intrinsic parts of contemporary developments in the Atlantic world and the continental processes of reconquest and settlement were either modelled on, or directly imitated, practices in North America. Hungary was to be an entrepôt for merchants and ministers, soldiers and settlers, a new site for development and design. Just as in North America, these early years of conquest and colonisation in southern Hungary had economic and administrative success as the ultimate objective, and most hinged on the successful plantation of the country with colonists. For the first time, the Habsburg administration found itself in the role of colonizer: not in the terra incognita of the Americas, nor in the res nullius of the Pacific, but in the ‘lost lands’ of Europe.

The Habsburgs thus became colonial enterprisers in a way which superficially resembled their British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Swedish and Danish royal peers, but in the more unusual position of colonisers within the European continent. The experiment of colonial government which led Sweden to colonise New Sweden along the Delaware took place in the Nordic north in the lands of the Sami; Britain had its colonial experiment in Ireland before venturing to New England in North America. The Habsburg Empire had its experiment in Hungary, before pushing later in the eighteenth century into Galicia in the north and thereafter consolidating her government of the northern Balkans in the nineteenth century. The Banat became the Habsburg beehive: a model and structure of colonial government desired and advocated. For the Empire to produce the rich honey of success, industrious worker bees would need to tend the land, feed from the fruit of the earth, and serve their Queen. In a model which was advocated in England’s colonies and in the Balkans alike, colonists were the worker bees of colonial industry, and the hive could be transplanted to different landscapes. The by-product of

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6 “In the absence of sustained argument to right of occupation grounded on the supposed nature of the indigenous inhabitants [colonizers] were driven to legitimize their settlements in terms of one or another variant on the Roman Law argument known as res nullius. This maintained that all ‘empty things’, which included unoccupied lands, remained the common property of all mankind until they were put to some, generally agricultural, use. The first person to use the land in this way became its owner.” Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800, New Haven and London, 1995, p. 76;

7 “Endorsed by both ancient wisdom and nature, the hive seemed to offer a perfect model for colonization. Just as bees swarmed from the overfull hive, English men and women should leave England, groaning under its heavy
this ordered society was sweet success and contentment for all. The under-populated, in part depopulated, Banat cried out for industrious workers, and colonists were promised great success in this land of milk and honey. But the model was doubly apt for the colonisation of Hungary, where it was also used: the beehive was both a blueprint for industry and commerce, and at the same time a paradigm for the construction of an ordered and disciplined society. Just as the hive provided a powerful model for the emergence of British colonies on the shifting and conflicted North America frontier, its inherent order allowed Habsburg state-builders to impose discipline and stability along the turbulent borderlands where Christianity and Islam collided.

The early eighteenth century, then, ushered in choice for potential colonists, and competition for their labour was inevitable. Colonists, the worker bees who built eighteenth-century Empires, were presented with the one great directional choice: to go east or go west, to Hungary or to America. The competition for colonists had now begun.

**Background to Emigration**

Social and demographic historians have long debated the importance of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in helping to explain movement from point of departure to place of destination. While this strategy of clarification is certainly helpful, it cannot always explain the particular contemporary reasons for movement. The central theme of how to pursue the decision to migrate is ignored in this equation. Into this position fit agents and their role as facilitators of migration. Migration, to take one historian’s definition, was the means to balance scarce resources in the interests of individuals, their families, and larger institutions within the framework of economic constraints and privileges. More importantly, revolutions in transportation and communication, often prompted and inspired by the activities of agents transporting migrants, brought about what has been called ‘a process of secularisation of hope.’ Foreign lands again became the stuff of fairy-

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8 Karen Ordahl Kuppermann, ‘The Beehive as a Model for Colonial Design’, in Kuppermann (ed.), *America in European Consciousness 1493-1750*, Chapel Hill and London, 1995, pp.272-292, here p.273. Of course, the hive is also a familiar analogy in Central Europe and the Balkans: the constitution of the *Matica srpska*, published in 1864, shows the seal of the organisation: between two trees is a bee-hive, out of which bees are flying and engraved round the bee-hive are the words ‘Pecat Matice Srbske’ (‘the seal of Matica srbska’).


9 ibid.
tales, where hunger never existed and people sailed on rivers of milk and honey. Belief in a better world, sometimes leaning very heavily towards a mythical ‘Eldorado’ was reinforced by the appearance of recruiters with their story-telling ability.10

The issue of population maintenance and the effects of emigration on the home society exercised the concerns of most European governments in the eighteenth century. In the European political theatre, dramatic demographic changes resulting from the Thirty Years’ War coalesced with cameralist and mercantilist economic theories, placing a large population at the nucleus of a healthy state. The body would not prosper without strong constituent organs: government, rule of law and a healthy and prosperous society. This society required an expanding base population to engage in proto-industrial activities. Depopulation, therefore, was a challenge to the very well being of this model of the state and the critical haemorrhage of labour required radical attention.

States chose to react to the possibility of migration in a number of ways. Many forbade emigration outright, denying subjects the opportunity to depart for another neighbouring or more distant land. Others legislated in a less categorical way, placing a financial obligation on those subjects leaving the territory. This payment, a direct contribution to state coffers, was often dissuasion enough to remain at home. Payment of a percentage of the net valuation of property and chattels, after settling any outstanding debts, would leave many families with little money to start a new life abroad. It was also an irreversible break with the home territory; should things go wrong in America or Hungary, there was no Heimat to which one might return. It also necessitated a near-complete emigration of kith and kin; no one might remain at home lest financial levies be imposed by the state. Taken together with a growing requirement for migrants to carry documentary evidence of their legal and moral standing (a passport of sorts), this prohibited many potential emigrants from leaving in the eighteenth century.

Emigration was viewed with different levels of distrust by various European governments. Early modern states were pressed to address the linked concerns of retaining a domestic population while attempting to seed overseas colonies with skilled and loyal subjects. Nowhere else was this concern more current than in Britain, where from the reign of Elizabeth onwards, debate centred on the advantage or disadvantage of the colonies for the domestic nation

and economy. Early modern English rulers thought that uncontrolled emigration would facilitate and encourage religious deviance at home and in the colonies; ‘masterless men’ tramping the highways of England would challenge the tight control of government.\textsuperscript{11} Still, the law allowed migration for purposes of performing seasonal or other temporary labour, as long as the migrant returned to the parish to which he belonged upon completion of such work. A distinction emerged, therefore, between movement overseas, where poor relief was not an issue of economic concern, and internal migration, where travel was portrayed as wasteful and morally degenerate.\textsuperscript{12} These laws, introduced to govern movement, helped to codify in law, and to implement in practice, a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ poor. Poor relief continued to be an issue of importance in the prohibition or support of emigration.

Across the Channel, similar developments were afoot. Unauthorized movements became increasingly associated with criminality after 1500, as a result of which vagrants, ‘masterless men’ and gypsies were subjected to repressive legislation designed to restrict their mobility.\textsuperscript{13} In the later sixteenth century, an edict of the Imperial Diet prohibited the issuance of ‘passes’ to ‘gypsies and vagabonds’, suggesting that such passes were required as part of the normal procedure for removing from one place to another, at least for those of the lower orders.\textsuperscript{14} By the seventeenth century, German rulers made laws intended to tie servants more firmly to their masters, and thus also to remove those recurrent problems for officialdom: vagrancy and itinerancy.\textsuperscript{15} While many states transported their poor and vagrant overseas, still others refused


\textsuperscript{12}Justin Stagl, A History of Curiosity, pp. 72-3, ‘A Consideration of the Arguments for and against Travel’.

\textsuperscript{13}A.L. Beier, Masterless Men, pp. xix and 10-11: in Tudor England, gypsies and the Irish were treated as vagrants, both groups being accused of sedition and treason, with the Irish being considered the more dangerous of the two groups by the seventeenth century. See also: Leo Lucassen, ‘Eternal Vagrants? State Formation, Migration, and Travelling Groups in Western Europe, 1350-1914,’ in Lucassen and Lucassen, eds., Migration, Migration History, History, op. cit., p. 228; Bronislaw Geremek, Truands et Misérables dans l’Europe moderne (1350-1600), Paris, 1976, esp. ch.4, ‘Le mauvais pauvre: stéréotype et réalité’, pp. 111-140.


\textsuperscript{15}Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800, New Haven, CT, 1983, pp. 74, 89-90.
to permit the destitute to depart the jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{16} However, all told, police ordinances in the German lands were of rather limited effect throughout the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{17}

Religion came to be consciously used as a reason to justify emigration to the Americas, which facilitated avoidance of payment of the gabella emigrationis, which extended the right of return to the Heimat (under Article V, §§36, 37 of Westphalia, 1648) and the right to inherit property in the homeland. Emigrants learnt that by citing religious persecution their path to a new life abroad was much easier; colonial powers would settle orphaned Protestants or Catholics fleeing religious persecution at home. The first mass movement which cited religious persecution as part reason occurred in 1709, when over 8,000 ‘Palatines’ fled their homeland and travelled initially to Rotterdam, where they awaited ships to carry them to England and on to America. This movement followed the successful dissemination of the so-called ‘Goldene Buchlein’ of Queen Anne inviting German Protestants to settle in North America.\textsuperscript{18} Not all were Protestant, however, and many ‘pseudo-Protestants’ were returned to Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{19} Still others were settled on the Lansdowne estates in Ireland, where they were envisaged as a bulwark against disloyal and troublesome Irish Papists.

Whether governments always made real and serious attempts to enforce these restrictions is another matter. Many states were all too aware that they did not possess the resources to coerce their subjects into obeying the numerous directives issued by their offices. Nor did they always wish to do so: many Protestants were ‘tolerated’ and permitted to settle in Hungary, while denied the right of departure to the American colonies. Double standards clearly existed, with prohibition on departure from the Empire at a time when imperially-sanctioned recruiters actively canvassed settlers for the reconquered lands in the east. Ordinances against emigration

\textsuperscript{17}Marc Rauff, \textit{The Well-ordered Police State}, passim.
were more to ensure that government was seen to take place; in reality many, if not most, laws were, in fact, openly flouted.\textsuperscript{20}

In the very early days of settlement in William Penn’s ‘Pennsylvania’, friends and acquaintances of the Quaker were employed to recruit colonists and labourers for the colony, becoming some of the first recruiters to work in the German lands for the colonisation of the British American colonies.\textsuperscript{21} Agents emerged because of their ability to access information pertaining to opportunities abroad not generally known to emigrants and to add to it a certain element of credibility which it might otherwise have lacked. This opening up of channels of information to people who would otherwise have, because of illiteracy or topographical isolation, remained ignorant of possibilities would tend to suggest a substantial improvement in knowledge of the colonies: areas which, after all, were to be new homelands. Certainly, many emigrants seem to have had inflated images of life in the British Colonies, believing that ‘in America or Pennsylvania roasted pigeons are going to fly into their mouths without their having to work for them.’\textsuperscript{22} And most migrants believed colonist recruiters, because they appeared as tangible proof that families and communities separated by borders and oceans might continue to exist in a network of communication, relationships and mental maps.\textsuperscript{23} Recruiters prevented the growth of any feeling of extreme dislocation or disorientation which emigration might otherwise have caused.\textsuperscript{24} What has been argued for the nineteenth century can equally be argued for the

\textsuperscript{22}Oscar Handlin & John Clive (eds. and trans.), \textit{Journey to Pennsylvania by Gottlieb Mittelberger in 1750}, Cambridge, MA, 1960; p.21.
eighteenth century: the many colonist agents who crossed the Atlantic ‘cement[ed] the existing commercial and industrial ties’ and supplied the niche market in information.\textsuperscript{25}

Significantly, as state-directed settlement in Old World Hungary coincided with state-controlled migration to New World America, agents recruiting settlers for Hungary learnt to market their destination in a language once reserved for the American colonies. Many settlers who became agents in the Hungarian Banat were quick to realise that ascribing a nomenclature of reference to Hungary previously reserved for America might result in increased emigration to the region. For this reason, they ascribed the name ‘Europe’s America’ to the Banat in the hope of increasing the popularity of the destination.\textsuperscript{26} Prohibitions placed on emigration to America may have veiled the destination in a cloud of allure and intrigue, which, together with circulating rumours of limitless land and opportunity, made it appear the most advantageous destination for hard-working immigrants. Agents were quick to realise that much of the determination to move to America was associated with the name, and while the sanctioned destination may not initially have been as well known, referring to the Banat as ‘Europe’s America’ infused Hungary’s reputation with positive attributes previously only associated with North America. While written correspondence from both America and Hungary varied greatly in style, they addressed similar themes: family issues; food, drink, land and religious practice.\textsuperscript{27} Not all letters were flattering to the new land, and many recruiters found it necessary to alter correspondence to support claims of a better life overseas. Some contemporaries claimed that these forgers were trained in the art of deception and others made anti-Semitic assertions that Jews, based at Rotterdam, were responsible for the censoring of emigrant letters.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} Dirk Hoerder,\textit{ Distant Magnets}, p.18.
The Role of the Agent

Yet historically, where there was a willingness to migrate, a way was found to ease the process of uprooting. In the Roman settlement of the imperial provinces, and again in the medieval colonisation of the Baltic states, locatores or attracters were used to tempt people to settle new territories. These colonist agents received payment for each and every colonist, or colonist family, they won over and escorted to the new land. The soldier trade in Europe relied heavily on the actions of agents in order to maintain robust army ranks. From the fifteenth century, shipping companies used agents to outfit vessels engaged in commercial trade around the globe. These brokers of human freight were often viewed in a derogatory way as little better than slave dealers, earning a reputation as ‘sellers of souls’ and traders in human capital. Agents were seen as contemptuous of intrinsic human value, preferring profit to the well being of men and women who placed their lives in their hands.

In the years after the Thirty Years War, agents scoured the German lands seeking recruits for regional armies, and towards the end of the seventeenth century providing manpower for the settlement of Habsburg territories in Eastern Europe. Population decline as a result of war, bad harvests and high infant mortality left some areas underpopulated and many regiments understaffed. Men tramping through villages offered, like their English counterparts, the ‘King's shilling’ to those who would enlist. Labelled Werber (Recruiters) or Enrolleurs, these men disseminated both oral and printed information. Their reputation was one of deceit and lies. Many rulers forbade the entry of agents into their territories; the fear of losing sections of the population inspired many secular, military and religious authorities to act against these agents. And the Cameralist fear of state collapse as a result of population decline was often expressed. States principally had three different recruiting methods, methods which would be developed and used for the recruitment of migrants for the colonies: commission, compulsion or contract.
Contemporary practices were comparable in states neighbouring the German Lands. In the Netherlands, shipping brokers known as Volkhouders acted for the navy, merchant navy and the VOC (the Dutch East India Company), and were responsible for the recruitment of sailors for the various ships in port. These recruiters or ‘Crimps’ offered lodgings, board, even clothes and shoes, all in an attempt to have recruits sign a bond, the so-called ceel in Dutch. This contract opened a line of credit for the recruit with the Volkhouder. All participants in this process were served by this system. The Dutch East India Company was supplied with a pool of labour by these recruiters; the Volkhouders profited from acting as middlemen; and finally the clients themselves, mostly German emigrants and foreigners to the Dutch ports, were offered instant credit and then a job. But these Volkhouders earned themselves a bad reputation, the seducers of innocent immigrants, treating them as ignorant victims washed ashore like flotsam. They were further accused of ‘selling’ their clients, that is, of often pawning the ceel or bond signed by the client to a moneylender for ready cash. This habit earned Volkhouders the name Zielverkopers (Soul Sellers; ziel, soul, being a pun in Dutch on ceel, bond), in German Seelenverkäufer (Soul sellers) or Menschenliebe (people thieves). These agents, many of whom were women and also (or alternatively) tavern keepers, worked from the seventeenth century in most Dutch ports for the shippers and shipping companies. From the eighteenth century they adapted their industry to facilitate the large number of German Rhineland immigrants arriving in the Low Countries. It was in this way that many Germans found themselves in Dutch service in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, signing themselves up for three–or five–year stints in the Dutch East Indies, the Cape or in other Dutch Colonies.

32 The ports in question were: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft (Delfshaven), Enkhuizen, Hoorn and Middelburg. According to Marc A. van Alphen, ‘The Female Side of Dutch Shipping: Financial Bonds of Seamen Ashore in the 17th and 18th Century’, in J.R. Bruijn and W.F.J. Mörzer Bruyns (eds.), Anglo-Dutch Mercantile Marine Relations 1700-1850, Leiden, 1991, pp.125-132, here p.131, n.2: ‘In the 17th and 18th century there were offices of the East-India Company (VOC) and—with the exception of Delft—of the Navy and West-India Company (WIC) in these ports.’
33 ibid., p.150.
Similar practices were employed in English ports in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with more desperate measures being taken in the second half of the eighteenth century as Europe-wide competition for soldiers and sailors reached a peak. British military recruiters were happy to enlist continental Protestants into the ranks of the army, especially for those regiments being sent to guard the territories of the East India Company. On 14 October 1768 the Committee of Shipping in London ordered that ‘healthy lads of about fourteen or fifteen years of age, of five feet in stature or upwards and such Swiss and German Protestants as might offer, should be accepted as recruits, till further notice on account of the scarcity of men.’ Already by the late 1760s the desperate need to recruit more soldiers in Britain had led to two proposed solutions. The first was to give the East India Company the right to recruit ‘by beat of drum’ in all parts of the King’s dominions. The second plan was that ‘of the whole number comprising this corps a proportion of not exceeding one third part of the Captains, Subalterns, N.C.O.s and Soldiers shall be German, Swiss or other foreign Protestants. The remainder to consist of His Majesty’s Protestant subjects of Britain and Ireland.’

In Russia too recruitment agents or Vyzyvateli (‘summoners’) worked to draw colonists, and especially Germans, into new lands opened up in the eighteenth century. From the publication of Peter I’s Manifesto of 1702, which summoned foreign immigrants to the new Russia, Russian recruiters became active in the German lands, seeking soldiers, merchants and artisans. In the era of Catherine the Great, a mass immigration was prompted by the 1763

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41Lindsey Hughes, ‘German Specialists in Petrine Russia: Architects, Painters and thespians’, in: Roger Bartlett and Karen Schönwälder (eds.), The German Lands and Eastern Europe, pp. 72-90. For edicts issued in the German Lands against emigration to Russia, see Landesarchiv Speyer, Bestand A2, Kurpfalz, Akten, Nr. 371/2/8,
manifesto for the settlement of the Russian lands, and agents were sent into the German and Swiss lands, broadcasting promises and enjoying remarkable success. Some of these agents worked for private estate owners, while others came under the auspices of central government offices.\footnote{\textit{Verordnungen über Aus- und Einwanderung, 1766-1785, Edikt des Kurrheinischen Kreises gegen Auswanderung nach Rußland.}}

It was, then, impossible in eighteenth century Europe to conceptualise emigration without coming under the influence of an agent or advertiser.\footnote{The Baron Caneau de Beauregard, resident in Holland, held influence with the government in Saint Petersburg and directed a company which set up colonies on the Volga, which were then given Swiss names. Finding his colonies taken over by the Catherine government in 1768, Beauregard offered his services as a recruiter to the Habsburg Administration in Vienna, before eventually returning in poverty to Holland. See: K. Stählin, \textit{Aus den Papiereen Jacob von Stählin\'s}, Königsberg and Berlin, 1926, pp. 332-335; Konrad Schünemann, \textit{Die Bevölkerungspolitik}, pp. 299-303; Roger Bartlett, \textit{Human Capital}, pp. 63-64.} Newlanders and agents were densely packed throughout the territories, so much so that many came in direct competition with one another.\footnote{Hermann Von Freeden and Georg Smolka (eds.), \textit{Auszanderung: Bilder und Skizzen aus der Geschichte der deutschen Auswanderung}, Leipzig, 1937, p.17 ff.} This competition led to an increase in, and further exaggeration of, the literature being produced about Pennsylvania. One brochure in the first half of the eighteenth century noted ‘And to speak about hunting [game], the Bison practically put their heads in the window of the log-cabin, waiting to be shot. And wolves are not as big as in Europe and can easily be tamed.’\footnote{See the case of Crellius and Köhler in \textit{Massachusetts State Archives}, ‘Emigrants’.} Colonist agents knew very well what aspects of life in Pennsylvania to highlight and exaggerate; everything which incensed individuals about life in the Old World was compared with Pennsylvania. Just as ‘[t]he German speakers of British North America could only conceive of the New World […] by referring to associations and meanings that still reflected the village and religious landscape from which they had emigrated’, so too could the dream of the New World only be sold as a recognisable product in advance.\footnote{J.K.L., \textit{Der Nunmehro in der neuen Welt vergnügt und ohne Heim-Wehe lebende Schweitzer}, Bern, 1734.} Thus recruiters spoke of unlimited hunting rights; of freedom from enlistment in the army; of religious freedom and of unlimited land and food. An agent’s success in a particular area depended more on his astute ability to recognise a region's shortcomings and to stress how Pennsylvania was better. There was no room for taciturn
individuals; these were individuals who combined human resource management skills with oral sales techniques.\textsuperscript{47}

**Johannes Tschudi**

To expose how most individuals became involved in the recruitment of colonists, let us take the example of one individual whose activities can be traced through the regional archives of five countries: Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, England and the United States. When the 25 years old Johannes Tschudi returned from Philadelphia to his village of Frenkendorf in northern Switzerland in 1751, he was dressed resplendently.\textsuperscript{48} He showed no sign of his old trade as a cooperator and to his former friends and neighbours he was a young man who had been successful enough to traverse continents and sail the seas, yet cared to return and share the secret of his good fortune with his family and friends. Were it not for the fact that Tschudi was arrested and charged with inciting others illegally to leave the Canton, we would never know of his existence. His arrest warrant and subsequent documentation concerning his 'treacherous' behaviour tell us more about his life and that of other recruiting agents and migrants than any church records or state grants of manumission.

Johannes Tschudi’s arrest warrant describes him as six feet tall, with a broad, ruddy, well formed face and blond curly hair; and only his broad frame hinted at some years of manual labour. Servile work was not anymore for the young Tschudi; after just two years in Pennsylvania, the twenty five years old man had returned dressed gaudily; wearing long blue city trousers, white stockings and city shoes and sporting a cane.\textsuperscript{49} Tschudi quickly came to realise that he had a story many people cared to hear, a story of land and bread, of freedom and success, of comfort and prosperity. But more than this, he was now a man who commanded respect and attention, attributes which were marketable in a society yearning for a saviour, who would lift the common person from their mundane existence. Tschudi learned that by recounting stories of life in America he could surround himself with spirited and appreciative audiences and at the


\textsuperscript{48}Staatsarchiv des Kantons Basel-Stadt (SKB-S), Auswanderung A, ‘Johannes Tschudi’, passim.

\textsuperscript{49}Albert B. Faust and Gaius M. Brumbaugh (eds.), *Lists of Swiss Emigrants in the Eighteenth Century to the American Colonies, Volume II, From the State Archives of Bern and Basel Switzerland*, Washington D.C., 1925, p.162.
same time as enhancing his social standing he could increase his financial worth, too. The return migrant became, by accident or design, a recruiter for the American colonies and like his peers working for the settlement of North America and Hungary, he entered the business of selling and driving souls to a new life overseas. Over the course of nearly twenty years Tschudi would organise the transportation of his extended family, their neighbours from many villages in the canton of Basel, together with numerous additional migrants, in a series of chain migrations to Pennsylvania. Large extended families and extended village groups, though disguised as unrelated travellers in ships’ records, eased the process of relocation to America and expedited the manner of settling in the new society. In all, Tschudi escorted many hundreds of migrants to America.

The Return Voyage from America

Having spent less than two years in Pennsylvania, Johannes Tschudi returned to his Heimat, nominally to visit relatives but also acting as a courier and carrying letters back for fellow Swiss and German American colonists. When he appeared in the Canton of Basel in 1751, Johannes was alone, without his wife, who may have died on the voyage to America two years previously, or she may have died during their first year in Pennsylvania. Tschudi may, like many other emigrants both in America and in Hungary, have returned to find himself another wife, or this may have been one factor contributing to his return. Whatever the reason, Tschudi's return alerted the Basel and Bern authorities to his presence in the region and his illegal activities in inciting locals to quit the state and they attempted to have him arrested, issuing his description as above. Johannes was making maximum use of his acquired 'otherness', wearing clothes which did not befit his born rank of a tradesman and yet which appealed to the desire for social advancement amongst his friends and family.

The mass exodus from south-west Germany and the northern Swiss Cantons in 1749 spurred the cantonal authorities into action, which had consequential effects on Johannes Tschudi's return trip to Basel and Bern in 1751. Basel followed in the footsteps of Zürich and

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50 We know that he was re-married by or before 1767. See below.
Bern in forbidding emigration to America, and issued a decree in 1749 which outlined the consequences of such an action in defiance of the law. Tschudi managed to evade the grasp of the Basel and Bernese authorities, and left the territories with sister Elsbeth, brother Weinbert and cousin Lorenz. Elsbeth and her fiancé were married aboard the Janet when en route from Rotterdam via Cowes to Philadelphia, but Elsbeth succumbed to the rigorous voyage and died immediately upon arrival in Philadelphia.\footnote{Faust, II, pp.164-5.}

Johannes ventured to make a journey to Bern and Basel once again in 1767, officially to collect inheritances for himself and his wife. Tschudi may also have held power of attorney on behalf of other Pennsylvania residents to allow him settle estates in Europe on their behalf.\footnote{Tschudi may, like a number of returning emigrants, have possessed power of attorney for other individuals in Pennsylvania. See, for example, GAA, Notarial Archives, 14160/1147 (13 September 1773), (text in German); Power of attorney for Johann Friedrich Motte, merchant in Amsterdam, by Johan Andreas Uhlers, issued by Peter Miller, Philadelphia, on 20 June 1773, directing Rauch & Beck at Heilbronn to perform the affairs to which he was authorised.} On this, his second trip back and his fourth Atlantic crossing, Johannes was arrested by the Basel authorities and interviewed about his activities in the canton. He and his relations were banned and together with a small number of neighbours, travelled together to Rotterdam. There the group boarded the Ship Sally, captained by Patrick Brown, and sailed over Cowes, fulfilling the requirements of the Navigation Acts, and from thence to Philadelphia.

The Sally arrived in Philadelphia Port on 10 November 1767.\footnote{Strassburg & Hinke, vol. I, p.775.} On Monday 23 November, an advertisement appeared on page three of the Philadelphia German-language newspaper 'Millers Zeitung' which ran for a further two editions of the paper, appearing on both 30 November and 7 December.\footnote{Der Wöchentliche Philadelphische Staatsbote. Mit den neuesten Fremd- und Einheimisch- Politischen Berichten; Samt den von Zeit zu Zeit in der Kirche und Gelehrten Welt sich ereignenden Merkwürdigkeiten is the full title of this newspaper, edited by Heinrich Miller and published in Philadelphia.} On both occasions this advertisement appeared on page three under the caption Klage über einen bösen Neuländer, 'Complaint about a bad Newlander'. The advertisement was signed by three men on behalf of all Germans aboard the vessel the Galley [recte Sally] and presents an interesting commentary on both Tschudi and the perception of Newlanders and recruiting agents.\footnote{Between 1727 and 1775, no vessel sailing from Rotterdam to Philadelphia was called the Galley, which is, rather, a type of vessel. All three men’s names appear on the November list for the Sally, but the name Galley may have been used to distinguish this ship, under Captain Brown, from a vessel of a similar name, captained by John Osman,
We, the under signed, on our behalf and in the name of all other Germans from the ship Galley [sic], Captain Brown, find ourselves obliged to hereby make known to our valued Countrymen and women here [in America], that Johannes Tschudi, by birth a Swiss, was this year in his Homeland, in order to take his relations with him to this country. In spite of the fact that he behaved himself so badly there a number of years ago, that the Basel Authorities forbade him entry into their area; yet he nonetheless had the impudence to steal into that same Canton, and to deceive people there, for he enticed and seduced nearly fifty people there to go with him (chiefly because he brought his mother with him); what is more they trusted him because he had the appearance of a great religious man. He irresponsibly and roguishly deceived them with regard to their freight on the Rhine and in other ways, that one can in no way doubt what his brother said is the truth, that is, that he had been outlawed in Basel. He gave the people no receipt for the money they brought along with them, but rather offered them physical threats, when they requested such of him; he allowed incorrect debts be made out by the merchant, and when reasonable accounts were requested, threatened all with shackles; once he was of a mind to attack the people in a murderous way with a pointed iron, had he not been hindered from doing so by our honoured and worthy Captain, who also forbade him come aboard the ship in the future. All things considered, he is a paragon of wickedness, an arrant liar, an out-and-out deceiver. And worst of all, which must cause a virtuous person horror, is that he cloaked his scheming with the Word of God, and took the Name of the most high and holy Name of God in the most brazen way. That the above is the truth, we hereby attest, in the name of all the ship's freights,

Johannes Henner,

Simon Senn,

Johannes Baumann.57

which docked in Philadelphia on the 5th October, 1767. The name Salley is used by the these same writers in their next letter dated 23 February 1768. Cf. Strassburg & Hinke, vol. I, pp.713-714; pp.768-776.

Johannes Tschudi refused to accept the accusations levelled against him by those migrants he escorted to Philadelphia and replied to their text in like form, having a letter published in Millers Zeitung less than three months later:

Tuesday, the 16th February 1768. No. 317.

A Newlander vindicating his Honour

Baltimore Town, the 8th December 1767.

Truth and Falsehood are two different things. We Germans pronounce falsehood with one word, a lie, in the plural, lies. Christ, the voice of Truth, says in John, Chapter VIII: The Devil is a liar and a father of liars; therefore those people who love, speak, write or in all other possible ways convey falsehood are the devil's favourites, or to say this another way, they are the devil's instruments.

As I, the undersigned, a number of days ago read an advertisement in the Philadelphische Staatsboten, or in Heinrich Millers German newspaper, number 305, which appeared under the title or address: "Complaints against a Newlander", in which three dishonourable, dishonest and mendacious Arch-rogues shamefully, slanderously and libelously attacked my name and character, that in order to save my honour and good name, I wish to oppose with these few words these irresponsible slanders. That they further say, I seduced and dragged many away with me under the guise of being a saint, who were deceived by my 'assumed' holiness, is again a falsehood. That however it was said that I was outlawed,\(^{58}\) can be explained in this way; the Swiss wanted no-one further to be allowed to move away from Switzerland to America, and because they feared I might persuade people go with me, they did not want to tolerate me. This cannot be called outlawed, because it was not through any bad conduct of mine that I should be banished, but rather the Lords simply feared that I wanted to convince people to go with me. And this was the whole story. From this any sensible man can conclude what these three mendacious

\(^{58}\)Tschudi uses a past passive form to avoid using a personal pronoun in this sentence; thereby avoiding any direct reference to his being outlawed; "Daß aber Vogelfrey seyn soll gemacht worden seyn...".
villians, urged on and raised by the devil, are trying to do away with my honour and good name. For the latter they use their cursed, wicked tongues against me with great fury; I will not avenge these vicious accusations any further, because they have already been refuted enough above.

Candid Warning to the Public about these Three Rogues.

Johannes Henner wanted to stab someone to death in the 1740s, and wounded him with three stab wounds; he was healed again however by a skillful surgeon; but for this reason he was not executed but rather exiled for six years. During the time of his absence in the Bern region he all but made two women pregnant at the same time. And when he returned home, shortly thereafter looted a wagon and such was his behaviour that he was no longer permitted to remain in the country. A watch was placed around his house at night time to observe him, but he escaped.

Johannes Burmann, a French Catholic and a tailor, confessed to me himself that he had stolen a pair of trousers from a man, as the man watched, because he cut his coat.

Johannes Tschudi.  

And Tschudi’s accusers would not go away, replying the very next week to his letter:

Tuesday, the 23rd February 1768. No. 318.

Elucidation of a Sermon of Lies.

Philadelphia, the 23rd February 1768.

After almost three months, Johannes Tschudi has finally dared to present a lame response to the public, the legitimate accusations made against him by the Germans who arrived here

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59 "In Zeit seiner Abwesenheit im Berner Gebiet aber zwey Weibsbilder zu einer Zeit beynahe geschwängert".
60 Translation my own.
Question: Can someone who has no honour, save his honour? Answer: No.

We, the undersigned, as well as our trusted fellow men, are poor foreigners, who partly serve, and partly must miserably nourish ourselves, and can therefore spend neither much time nor money on arguments with the notoriously bad Newlander Tschudi,62 nor would we dignify him with an answer, if he had not sought to label us in such a heinous and satanical way as thieves.

We said the Basel Authorities forbade Tschudi to enter their territory because of his bad actions, but that he nonetheless slipped in. That people can slip into a country where they are forbidden entry can be proved by the secret advertising. That he tempted and seduced people to move away can be proved through the thirteen verses of his songs of encouragement, which he had printed in Basel. That he tricked us with the Rhine and sea freight remains true. He promised he would be a father to us and to help us cross the sea, that was until he had us in his grasp, then he proved himself to be more a rake than a father, and we had to sign whatever he wanted us to. He was a wicked man, a liar and a cheat [deceiver]. To that we now add that in Cologne, the inhabitants threatened they would throw him into the Rhine (certainly not because of his virtue). This is the pious man who can tolerate no curses, oaths, quarrels and scuffles and suffers all indulgently, as he will shamelessly have the public believe. One sees only the meek, rounded and graceful expression of his sermon of lies, where it becomes apparent whose spiritual child he is. What the heart is full of, that leaves through the mouth.

Now we want to contemplate Tschudi's so-called Heartful Warning, and answer it.

Even though Tschudi is very skillful in pretending, Johannes Burmann did not perceive him to be a Catholic priest and nobody would believe that he confessed to him, he had stolen a pair of trousers.

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61 These newspaper numbers should read 305 and 306.
62 The original letter/advertisement placed on the 23 November 1767 ran for three editions of the newspaper (nos. 305, 306, 307); Tschudi's reply for three editions (nos. 317, 318, 319, on page three on all but the last occasion, when it is placed on the final page, page four), and the reply to Tschudi's letter/advertisement runs for two editions (nos. 318, 319, with Tschudi's reply to the November letter following directly after the second letter in no. 318). It is not known how much such lengthy articles would have cost, but their length and frequent occurrence must have raised the cost. An advertisement for a run-away horse, running to four column lines and placed in 1766 cost 8
We have no need to warn the public against Tschudi, for his knavery is well known in
two parts of the world, and he has already warned the people through his actions to be careful of
him.

Tschudi became a recruiting agent, in the pay of a Rotterdam shipping house, by the
accident of his return to Europe. Yet the obvious question which then arises is: who recruited
Tschudi? On closer inspection of the shipping manifests for Tschudi’s first voyage to
Philadelphia, one finds that, travelling aboard the Crown in 1749 was one Johannes Marti
[Martin], a fellow national of Johannes Tschudi who had travelled to South Carolina in 1735 and
had moved with all the other forty-four 'Switzers' aboard the Oliver to Philadelphia in August of
that year. 63 Marti was one of many in the Canton of Bern who were attracted by the numerous
pamphlets and agents working for the settlement of Purrysburgh in South Carolina, a settlement
founded by Colonel Jean Pierre de Purry in 1732. The excitement occasioned by the prospect of
moving to Carolina was such that one Bernese official referred to the emigration fever as the
Rabies Carolinae.64 Marti was most likely the agent responsible for the mass movement of 1749,
for it appears that he travelled to Europe as a colonist recruiter a number of times in his lifetime.
Marti’s name and signature appear on both the original 1735 list and on the list for the passenger
inventory for the Crown on 30 August 1749.65 Tschudi, then, learnt his trade as agent from an
experienced man and would continue in future years to make five trans-Atlantic trips, recruiting
German and Swiss colonists for North America. This was a chain migration, but it was also a
chain recruitment, where the apprentice learnt from the master agent.

Few German colonists travelling to North America were even vaguely aware of the
organization involved prior to their embarkation at Rotterdam or Amsterdam. When Johannes
Tschudi stepped aboard the Crown in 1749, he may have known little of the time spent by
merchants and traders in England, the Netherlands and America in organizing the voyage to
Philadelphia aboard that vessel. Over a year was spent on planning, organizing and executing

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64 Faust, II, pp.17-18; Andreas Blocher, Die Eigenart der Zürcher Auswanderer nach Amerika 1734-1744, Zürich,
this one crossing from Rotterdam to Philadelphia, and yet more time was spent on the organization of 'freights' in Germany and Switzerland. The voyage of the Crown was unique, not just for those who travelled to the New World, but also for those involved in its financing, and remains unique, in light of the intertwining records available recounting its story.

Collusion between return-migrants, now becoming agents, ships’ captains and merchants in the Low Countries, England and America resulted in migrants being increasingly treated as ‘human freight’. It also resulted in more fierce competition between agents for control of the supply of these cargoes; it was not unusual for agents to 'poach' migrants from one another with more tempting promises of comfortable voyages and safe transportation. Dutch merchants and shippers established networks along the Rhine and in this way ensured that assembled Germans would be delivered safely, thereby avoiding the possibility of their being 'poached' by other shippers. The importance of internal competition in the United Provinces cannot be overlooked: Amsterdam shippers were to the fore in developing these Rhine river networks, bringing them into open competition with their Rotterdam colleagues.

Between 1727 and 1775, 317 German emigrant voyages employed 190 different captains on trans-Atlantic voyages.\textsuperscript{66} With this large number of captains involved in the trade – each captain averaging just 1.5 trans-Atlantic voyages – it was crucial to have a knowledgeable agent aboard, who might placate the passengers and act as intermediary between the captain and passengers. Emigrants were important freight for ships which underutilized space on return voyages from Europe to America: the surge in emigration between the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War (1748-56) raised the average number of emigrants per vessel from 185 to 300 at a time when more ships than ever were engaged on the route. Under-utilization of potential capacity aboard ship might negate any charge of monopolization of trade on the route.\textsuperscript{67} A large number of merchants, the greater number of all those engaged in trans-Atlantic trade, took only occasional consignments of Germans. Agents, then, were brokers in a commodity which fluctuated in value just as any transportable merchandise did.

Conclusion

Research on trans-Atlantic migration has highlighted the individual nature of German migration to America: most migrants travelled individually, or were less family-oriented in their movement than those who chose to move eastwards. This received wisdom is cast in doubt by the activities of colonist recruiters and agents. The suggestion that migration westwards was composed predominantly of individuals fails to make allowance for the tightly-knit structure of the extended family unit as evidenced in this case by the extended Tschudi family, although it is only one of many such movements. While only three of the one hundred and thirty-four men who signed the Crown's register in 1749 were Tschudis, they and their families represented a sizeable percentage of the total passenger number of four hundred and seventy-six. On closer examination of the lists at least twenty-two of all the men listed were related to each other through marriage, and many others were neighbours or residents of their village in the Swiss Confederation. The entire ship was passengered by those recruited by Tschudi. It should also be remembered that they were perhaps but one of the several family and village units aboard the vessel, with the Tschudis alone accounting for anything between one third and one quarter of the entire vessel's passengers. Agents were, therefore, responsible in many instances for transplanting extended family units to America and to Hungary; when not related by blood, migrants were often fellow parishioners or baronial residents. Johannes Tschudi's return to the Swiss cantons in 1751, possibly in search of a wife, highlights marriage patterns seen amongst German migrants to both Hungary and America. Tschudi is but one example of a recruiting agent operating for the colonisation of North America and parts of Europe in the eighteenth century, but his case is an exemplary and instructive one. Whether involved in the transportation of migrants to North America

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67 A point most ably made by Mittelberger, Shipping of German Immigrants, pp.45-47. Some larger ships were said, possibly apocryphally, to have boarded up to 1,000 passengers: cf. Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted, Boston, 1973, p.45.

68 Marianne Wokeck states that only 17% of all men who immigrated through Philadelphia between 1730 and 1750 shared their last name with one other man placed next to them on the lists of the same ship. Cf. Wokeck, 'The Flow and the Composition of German Immigration to Philadelphia, 1727-1775', Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 1981, p.272.

69 Tamás Faragó, Types of Peasant Households and Work Organisation in Hungary in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century, Budapest, 1985. In his study of three German villages founded in the district of Pest county in the eighteenth century, Tamás Faragó compares a number of villages of different ethnic make-up. In all areas taken into consideration, the German population and villages differed from those of the other ethnic groupings, with the other groups collectively being closer to a central 'norm' than the German villages were. In marriage patterns, for example, Germans tended to marry on average between five and eight years, in the case of women, later than all the other groups, and five and nine years later, in the case of men; ibid, p.171.
America or to Hungary, agents were the foundation on which the trade in strangers was built and they held together oft divergent private and state interests. Tschudi's actions reflect those of many agents trading colonists to Hungary, and both develop on, and precede, the actions of other agents working in North America. It is clear that, in the case of the Atlantic voyage, and in many instances of migration to Hungary, much depended on the detail of the organization of the trade in human freights, as in the involvement of shipping merchants in Rotterdam, Vienna, or elsewhere. It is also clear that it is no longer possible to generalize about the composition of German migration to the east and to the west. Neither movement was unique as both streams of migrations witnessed the movement of families and of young, unmarried men.

The competition for colonists which pitted colonial agent against private recruiter would no longer be between individuals working for the colonisation of America and Hungary. It would, in the mid-eighteenth century, become a competition between states and governments and between free market and regulated approaches to the demand and supply of labour. The colonial competition for German labour would lead to dramatic changes in the regulation of movement in Europe, to the regulation and realisation of intra- and inter-continental transportation and communication and ultimately to the ethnic form and composition of nation states in Europe and North America.

The active adaptation and reformulation of the mode and means of colonial settlement in the eighteenth century by military, economic and financial elites demonstrates the complex processes of accommodation, exchange and reform which shaped human settlement in the eighteenth century. Knowledge of the location and availability of settlers for these lands was not sufficient as a means of populating the British and Habsburg regions. German understandings of both American and Hungarian society and opportunity reflected pressures and innovations in North America and Hungary, at least as much as metropolitan ideologies such as populationalism and military protectionism. Moreover, the power of metropolitan interpretations was often dependent on experience in the colonies and local, agent recruiter, expertise, as these forms of local knowledge were not only more effective guides to policy-making, but were more likely to be accepted by new, settler communities. Into the gap between high-politic aspirations of a strengthened state and parochial dreams of a better life abroad fitted the colonist agent; entrepreneurial, mercurial, informed.
By the late eighteenth century, opportunities for settlers in America and in Hungary were well established and known in Europe. Many hundreds of thousands of willing migrants had left Europe and travelled in search of new opportunities in the east and in the west. Most of these migrants left their homelands for a variety of reasons; economic, social, political and religious. And the majority attracted the attention and influence of colonist recruiters at some point along their travel route. Matching individuals and families needed for a region with the information and ability to reach that destination took on new importance in the eighteenth century, as the desire to attain a strong, secure and successful population led to a competition for human cargo. Specialised local knowledge was needed to source potential settlers. Familiarity with the organs of government, with language, with means and modes of transportation, with the mustering and making ready of large groups of colonists; all these and many other skills were needed to insure a successful venture.

The colonist recruiter possessed these skills. Arising from the oft−hated soldier enlister, a class of men which drummed up recruits and thrust the king’s shilling on unwilling young men throughout Europe, agents came into contact with most sections of society in the course of their work, sliding skilfully through all tiers of church and state bureaucracy. Agents would take responsibility for promoting the new territory to potential colonists. They would act as an interface between commercial interests and bureaucracy; between the ‘Planter’ class of landowners and both colonists and governmental bureaucracy; as sources of local knowledge for the government and as ambassadors of knowledge to the sources of labour in the German lands.

This interplay between the demands of colonial administrators and migrants, in Vienna and Buda and in London and Philadelphia, led to tension concerning the objective of the colonial venture as a whole. Migrant aspirations and metropolitan policy were in constant dialogue; a dynamic process of exchange and challenge where claim and counter-claim led each interest group to modify its position almost constantly. By the 1760s particular craft and agricultural workers were more than ever specifically targeted for recruitment. This led to a change in the organisation and planning of the subsequent settlement of the Hungarian lands. Similarly in

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70 As in the case of priest agents who worked for the settlement of Hungary and also of the agent Johann Crellius, who operated in British North America in the 1740s.
Pennsylvania, Germans already established in the American colony responded to the dramatic increase in volume of migrants arriving in the preceding decade by establishing the German Society of Pennsylvania in 1764.\(^2\) Responding in a charitable fashion to the needs of recently-arrived poor fellow Germans, the organisation also assisted immigrants in litigation against shippers who mistreated them en route to America.\(^3\) Such simple changes were indicative of more substantial trends, which challenged the established transatlantic trade in German migrants.

The search for human capital, for recruitable settlers, was far broader and more developed by the end of the eighteenth century than it had been at any previous point in the century. The changes which had emerged in the late 1740s and early 1750s saw a change in the nature of transporting migrants from continental Europe to America from an occasional, seasonal and disorganised activity into a regulated, regularised and competitive enterprise, where merchants traded in a new, profitable freight.\(^4\) Here, as in the trade in migrants to Hungary, agent recruiters acted as middlemen, applying their expertise to co-ordinate the demand for labour with the supply of transportation. Agents acted as the essential link in facilitating an awareness of opportunity in parts foreign on the part of a domestic, sedentary audience. Their activities, together with considerably increased profit margins for shippers, meant that the trade in immigrants continued. As we have seen, the trade in supplying migrants from Europe to America also changed in the 1760s. As the peak of trans-Atlantic emigration passed in 1753-4, shipping merchants in the Dutch ports and in London returned to their occasional transportation of immigrants, leaving the principal business to American shippers, particularly those operating out of Philadelphia. This meant that as European traders saw less profit to be made in the transatlantic transportation of migrants, those same traders no longer required colonist recruiters to drum up human freight for European ships.\(^5\) Recruiters came to be robbed of their livelihood by the vagaries of the market economy.

Those settlers who became agents in Hungary and elsewhere in Central and eastern Europe were quick to realise that opportunities there were just as advantageous as in America.\(^6\)

\(^2\) See Chapter 6 above.
Mercy’s hopes, in the aftermath of reconquest, of reinforcing the region militarily gradually gave way to the economic concern of turning Hungary into an agricultural success. These economic interests were later overtaken by financial concerns that the province should become a source of tax revenue, rather than a cost to the state. But Vienna’s determination to implement an all-encompassing programme for the recruitment, escorting and settlement of German colonists came too late for the region. From 1767 Vienna instigated a more determined effort to have agents escort those families recruited in the empire for the settlement of Hungary, but the process of selection was limited to families capable of financially underwriting their own settlement costs. This decision damaged the goodwill and reputation which clearly existed for Hungary in the empire at a time of fierce competition in western Europe for migrants for the Atlantic colonies and the lands of rival European states. Whereas migration to Pennsylvania had been markedly changed in the late 1740s and early 1750s by the systematic organisation of the transportation of migrants from the Dutch ports to America, the opposite was the case in Austria. The issue of transportation to Hungary was not clarified in the 1760s as it might have been; the journey increasingly became the responsibility of individual migrants and financial consideration restricted the creation of an organized system. Faced with disorganisation and apparent apathy in Vienna, many migrants willingly accepted the comfortable terms and conditions offered by many private estate owners. Agents held decisive control over the shape and direction which migrations could take, be it helping to create a demand for migrants in America by recruiting large numbers for the transatlantic trade or meeting the demand for families in Hungary by recruiting in parts of the empire. An intermediary means of bringing commodities to market was needed, and in this market for human capital, labour was retailed most successfully by agents acting as brokers.

Thus a model of colonization and settlement in the eighteenth century which includes a consideration of the role and significance of agents offers profound insights into the development of colonial society in America and Hungary. There was never any simple colonial encounter between metropolitan interests and passive settlers. Colonization and relocation in the eighteenth century was in fact the product of co-operation and competition between colonist recruiter agents, acting for private landowners or governmental agencies, in a process that linked North
America with western and central Europe. Emigration was not a simple, localized, affair; rather settlers were being actively incorporated into the labour, economic and migration networks of empire in America and Hungary. Reductive approaches, often resorting to unhelpful push-pull models to explain demographic movement, tell us too little about the mechanics of colonization and migration in the eighteenth –or any– century. Only by charting the sourcing, transportation and initial settlement of migrants can we understand the complex processes that were at work. A variety of different groups, in Germany, Vienna, Hungary, England and America, speaking from a range of different economic, political, defence and religious positions, shaped and contested this process. Moreover such debates, which include the varied and complex involvement of colonist agents, help to remind us that regions such as Hungary and America cannot be entirely separated in the important international market in human capital which emerged in the eighteenth century and which no longer involved just the Atlantic world but areas beyond. The complex realities and hybrid nature of a migrant society in the eighteenth century challenge the more narrowly defined boundaries of nation and national identity of our time. Many migrants moved from location to location without seeing any cultural or community break resulting. Landscapes changed, but the individuals remained the same, as agents facilitated the process of relocation in a new land.

Strangers, pp. 27-31 and 116-117.