

Indigenous Territories, Colonial Encounters, and Nation-State Boundaries in the Americas

Beth Simmons¹ (simmons3@law.upenn.edu), University of Pennsylvania.

Tulia G. Falletti² (falletti@sas.upenn.edu), University of Pennsylvania.

Thought Piece Prepared for

Columbia World Projects & Centre for History and Economics Workshop
Constructing Borders

March 24 and 25, 2022

Introduction

Human, social, and political organization is spatially organized. Historically, humans have created physical boundaries to communicate the bounds of their political organization. How this is accomplished over time and space is the subject of this memo. Using a political economy lens, we examine five hundred years of border making, maintenance, and change in the Americas. Our central argument is that a political economy lens is useful for understanding bordering processes. This lens calls attention to the relationship between geography, demography, infrastructure and property rights.

Some preliminary points are in order. First, we recognize the audacity of discussing half of the earth over five hundred years. Our lens will necessarily highlight some processes, while neglecting others, and cannot possibly do justice to the variety of motives and means human civilization has devised for marking physical space. Second, while a political economy approach is useful, it is hardly the only, and may not even be the best way to understand bordering processes. Third, received historical accounts are contested. Moreover, much work needs to be done to recover understandings of peoples, places and processes that the map makers of the day chose not to include (or perhaps did not understand). Fourth, while many kinds of borders and boundaries are relevant, we limit our discussion to borders that can fairly be understood as political borders: understandings of the limits of indigenous, colonial, and state political authority. Finally, we organize our account around pre-Columbian, early colonial, state consolidation periods. These periods overlap and occur in different decades (even different centuries) throughout the Americas. We are not historians and have no particular stake in the precise periodization. Instead, we wish to draw attention to the ways in which production, warfare, property rights and physical infrastructure have historically facilitated border making and unmaking in time and space. The conclusion points to unresolved questions of identity for groups that are split by international borders. Border hardening, at least in north America, has only contributed to the practical problem of maintaining groups contact and identity.

¹ Simmons acknowledges support and funding from the University of Pennsylvania.

² Falletti acknowledges generous funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation through the *Just Futures* Initiative grant N-2009-09221 entitled “Dispossessions in the Americas: the Extraction of Bodies, Land, and Heritage from *la Conquista* to the Present”, where she is Principal Investigator, and Margaret Bruchac, Ricardo Castillo-Neyra, Ann Farnsworth-Alvear, Michael Hanchard, Jonathan D. Katz, Richard M. Leventhal, and Michael Z. Levy are co-PIs. Falletti also acknowledges the valuable comments and research contribution of cultural anthropologists Carmen Medeiros and Radek Sánchez, who drew or compiled Maps 2 through 4.

Indigenous territories before colonial encounter

Archeologists and geographers estimate that approximately 60 million Indigenous peoples inhabited the Americas at the time of the first colonial encounter in 1492 (Denevan 1992 [1976], xvii, Koch, et al. 2019, 15). One century later, largely due to disease, warfare, and exploitation, the Indigenous population was decimated to about 6 million people (Fenn 2001, 6). In geographic terms, the colonial encounter led to the abandonment and secondary succession of 56 million hectares of land (Koch et al. 2019, 30).

So drastic were these impacts that they have overwhelmed contemporary efforts to clearly understand how indigenous peoples established, defended and challenged understandings of “their” territories. Most scholarly accounts imply that borders between Indigenous peoples or nations in the Americas before Columbus’ arrival were often thought to be fuzzy or not clearly delineated. As it is narrated by today’s Indigenous peoples, their ancestral territories (quite often) extended for “as far as the eye can see.” However, it does seem likely that Indigenous peoples’ territorial occupation was largely correlated to their primary mode of food production.

Movement patterns were often key. *Transhumant* peoples, such as the Mapuche, moved across the territory following the seasons’ cycle, and their ancestral territory or Wallmapu extended from sea to sea, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, in what is nowadays southern Argentina and Chile.³ In the Great Chaco, the ancestrally *nomadic* Wichí people moved extensively through their ancestral territory to fish and hunt, and often redefined their territory with the movement of the Pilcomayo river. *Sedentary* peoples developed local subsistence economies and developed trade routes, for example the Tsimshian people traded fish oil through a route that went from Alaska to southern British Columbia. Such routes did not go through “empty space.” Indigenous peoples had a clear idea of the territorial realms through which they moved. Access was negotiated, challenged, and the boundaries of tribal lands were typically well understood (Barr 2011).

Indigenous peoples that were organized as “empires,” such as the Incas and the Aztecs, had some of the most highly developed infrastructural features for territorial defense. Their “borders” were zonal and dynamic (Sheets 2000, 408), but as the Inca empire expanded, territory was defended with collection fortresses, fortifications, and military installations. Near what is now northwest Argentina, the array of installations suggests the border was relatively stable and defined. (Raffino and Stehberg 1999).⁴ The Inca Empire also used population resettlement strategies to divide hostile groups, increase agricultural productivity, and to stabilize its border zones, often rearranging ethnic settlement patterns in the process (Medeiros 2022).⁵ Waves of expansion,

³ To this date, the Mapuche people, for instance, move their livestock from winter grazing grounds (*tierras de invernada*) to summer grazing grounds (*tierras de veranada*), located at different altitudes in the Andean mountains.

⁴ These conquered populations could be quite considerable. Raffino and Stehberg (1999) estimate “the Inca state conquered more than 650,000 inhabitants in the south-central Andes or Kollasuyu” (p. 180).

⁵ According to Medeiros (2022), “Building on the model of vertical control of ecological tiers, the Inca implemented important resettlement policies to defend the expanding frontiers and increase the agricultural production for the state. Breaking up ethnic groups that were hostile or rewarding those that were loyal with access

from the epicenter in the city of Cusco (or Qosqo), in the south of today's Perú, to Ecuador to Chile (Mann 2011, 85-93), are illustrated in Map 1. Map 2 shows a rough estimation of the extent of the Tawantinsuyu conquest at the time of the Spanish arrival. Map 3 shows some of these resettlements in the Cochabamba valley. As illustrated in Map 4, this vast territory was integrated by a complex system of Inca roads that connected a multiplicity of administrative and trading centers.

In North America, some of the same political economy themes of Indigenous territorialization and bordering are found. According to Juliana Barr (2011, 11), "Hunter-gatherer Coahuilteco speakers, sedentary Caddo agriculturalists, and raiding Apaches and Comanches all claimed, used, and defended lands as uniquely their own but, in doing so, evinced quite distinct expressions of bordered domain."

Mobile hunter-gather bands, might control territory individually, or in common, as conditions dictated. Land-sharing did not serve to reduce their sense of bounded territory, however. The archaeological record is rich with evidence of signs and symbols demarcating territorial domains in what is now south Texas (Barr 2011, 16). As primarily hunter-gatherers, the Ervipiame had their own unique conception of property rights. When these were enforced against early Spaniards, Barr describes their enforcement as answering to trespassing charges (Barr 2011, 17).

The sedentary Caddos who occupied a region stretching across present-day Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma, "marked and policed its borders." (Barr 2011, 22). Documentary evidence suggests that for decades the Spanish were excluded from these territories, but when they eventually gained entrance (in 1690) they were escorted by guards and under constant surveillance (Barr 2011, 24). Barr reports that the Caddos had a customary system of passports containing objects "that identified the bearer as friend or ally." (Bar 2011, 28).

The highly mobile Comanches and Apaches, whose political economy depended more than in other cases on raids, had incentives to increase their territorial control, and engaged in border wars to do so. Barr is clear this did not reduce their territorial attachments (Barr 2011, 36); instead, these highly mobile and expansionist tribes developed detailed systems of demarcation – cairns, tally marks, carvings, painted tree trunks – to demarcate their (often changing) political-economic borders. Native women had safe passage as non-combatants as they moved between claimed territories and ethnic borders (Barr 2011, 37).

to new valley lands, the Incas relocated large segments of population into different and sometimes very distant areas thereby changing the ethnic composition of the conquered territories. Resettled populations, called *mitmaqkuna* (or *mitimaes* in Spanish colonial records) formed multiethnic colonies and retained, in principle, their ethnic ties with their native communities. In practice, however, they were under direct supervision of state officials and administrators. ... In short, the human landscape, the composition and location of the different nations and ethnic groups, the Spaniards found when they conquered the Tawantinsuyu in the 1530s was the result of Inca resettlement and population policies."

In Mesoamerica, population density was higher, which meant that borders between chiefs and cities were clearer. Early Spanish explorers wrote of “provinces” and “borders” when they first arrived in the region.⁶

Overall, Native American notions of “territoriality” seem to have varied enormously, as did the means, techniques, and purposes of establishing geopolitical borders. Some groups had quantitative measurements of territorial boundaries, but most did not appear to use surveys for determining political boundaries (Greer 2018).⁷ Most did not have European-style maps, but did have very clear and detailed “mental maps” of their domains, which they could describe orally in exquisite detail. Some of the border markers and customs were not especially legible to Europeans, but served a clear purpose among native groups, and which Barr suggests early Europeans would ignore at their peril.

From the Colonial Period to State Consolidation

Territorial organization of Indigenous groups has not only been heterogenous, it has been profoundly affected by colonial political economies, imperial rivalries, and national political economies. And here, the experiences of North and South America seem to diverge somewhat. For the most part, the Spaniards did not change the Indigenous territorial occupation. They extracted labor from Indigenous communities through *encomienda* - grants by the Spanish Crown to their colonists in America conferring the right to demand tribute and forced labor from the Indian inhabitants of an area for extraction of precious metals and agricultural labor. To be sure, the Spaniards used the strategy of divide and conquer in their alliances and wars and enslavement of different Indigenous populations. These processes were facilitated by a lack of colonial competition in the southern continent of the Americas.

Competition among British, French and Spanish colonial interests in North America had an important influence on bordering processes North America. Adelman and Aron (1999) argue that “borderlands” – contested boundaries between colonial domains⁸ – were important between early colonialism and the consolidation of the United States. These zones were fluid, and interpenetrated by commercial relationships among and between indigenous and European populations. (Note Barr’s rejoinder: these were already sovereign spaces that for a significant period dictated Europeans movements and rights.) According to Adelman and Aron, it is only after the collapse of inter-colonial competition, and the rise of “hegemonic” domination of British settlement on the continent that borderlands gave way to frontiers – *supposedly* borderless regions into which settlers armed with Anglo conceptions of private property rights rushed.

⁶ For instance, Hernán Cortés wrote: “The aforementioned province and dominion of Aculuacan has many other villages and hamlets and very good lands and farms. This province borders on one side with the province of Tascalteca, of which I have already spoken to Your Majesty.” (Cortés, 1971, 97 cited in Sanders, 1992 [1976], 107).

⁷ In some cases they demonstrated outright hostility to land surveys, which they correctly anticipated would lead to European settlement.

⁸ Note that Juliana Barr is responding to this characterization, which she argues treats north America like empty space whose eurocentrically defined border zones give native Americans “space” for some agency. On the contrary, she argues, “at the time of European invasion, there was no part of North America that was not claimed and ruled by sovereign Indian regimes. Thus, we must begin by acknowledging the fundamental essence of Indian sovereignty – the power a nation exerts within unambiguous borders” (Barr 2015, 9).

The blunt difference was this: Spain came to exploit the native American populations, while the British and their Anglo-American descendants came to replace them. This is of course an oversimplification, but it is the likely result of differences in property rights conceptions already evident in colonial rule. In Spanish colonies, borders were first drawn to tax *tributos* to Indigenous communities, and later to curb contraband and exercise overall tighter political and administrative control—including of the Church. *Títulos de colonia* recognized specific Indigenous territorialities [500 *varas* in 16th and 600 *varas* in each direction in the 17th century] and the [four] Viceroyalties [by the time of the Bourbon reforms in the 1780s] also created borders, some of which became the borders of the independent nation-states thirty to fifty years later (source). In regions settled by Spain, Portugal and France, land was *owned* by the crown and *leased* to a few landed elites. Moreover, “In Latin America, land and mineral ownership was retained by the sovereign with use rights to large tracts of land granted to political and economic elites. Mineral rents largely were reserved by the crown” (Libecap 2018, abstract). To be sure, indigenous groups would be exploited, but they were needed at least for a time to enrich the crown and its privileged designees.

The contrast with North America is potentially interesting. The connection of indigenous groups with their ancestral lands was impacted by English ideas of property rights. Under English common law, individuals not only could own land outright, but their title included all mineral rights under the surface (Libecap 2018). This created huge incentives for settlers to push into regions and claim or buy real property, *and to carefully define and enforce their property rights*. The clearest way to do so was through surveying and demarcating land borders. As early as 1785, Federal Land Ordinance called for the survey of all federal lands into 6 square mile townships aligned along exact latitude and longitude. The effect was to raise property values, encourage collective action of property holders vis-à-vis indigenous groups, and point the way to border demarcation and maintenance through localized enforcement (Libecap 2018). Some research suggests that the process of surveying individual property claims, with linear specifications, originating in the North American British colonies, made “modern” international borders possible by giving rise to precise boundary specifications which elites transferred from their private property demarcation to the creation of fixed linear borders with neighboring sovereign states. Goettlich (2019, 1) argues that precise linear borders were a “crucial step” toward the establishment of modern state territoriality. It was also a way to radically, violently, and legally separate indigenous peoples from their ancestral land.

Nation-State building in the Americas was a continuing process of assimilation, of erasing Indigenous languages, cultures, identities, and territories. In the late 19th century, in the south of current day Argentina and Chile, military campaigns led by the armies of Chile (ironically called “Pacification of the Araucanía”) and of Argentine (also ironically termed “the Conquest of the Desert”) represented genocidal campaigns with land grabs that that went to army commanders and members of the national elites.

Whither Indigenous borders? An agenda for research

In every state of the Americas, the establishment of external territorial boundaries or international borders has divided one or more pre-existing ethnic Indigenous peoples or ancestral first-nations whose territories were split into the confines of two (or more) separate modern nation-states.⁹ For instance, the borders of the new nation-states separated Indigenous nations,

such the Mapuche in Patagonia (or Wallmapu), the Guaranies in the Great Chaco, the Aymaras in the Andes, and the Mayas in the Yucatan Peninsula, among many others.

In some cases, despite this imposed international jurisdictional division, Indigenous peoples maintained their pluri-state single ethnic identity and moved seamlessly between the new borders, even centuries after the external borders were created and consolidated. Examples of such cases include the Aymaras around the Lake Titicaca in the border between Peru and Bolivia; or the Aymaras in the border between northern Chile and Bolivia; or the Mapuche in the south of Chile and Argentina. In other cases, instead, the external border has unleashed a process of “ethnogenesis” or the creation of new ethnic groups defined by their new republican or modern nation-state ascription. This has been the case of the Collas, for instance, in the northwest of Argentina, who become ethnically differentiated of their ancestral lineage.

Why do some borders seem irrelevant to the reproduction of ethnic Indigenous identities, while others have effects as powerful as ethnogenesis?¹⁰ How do Indigenous peoples negotiate the hardening of external territorial boundaries that are not of their own making and that divide their territory and communities? When and why are those boundaries ignored? When do external boundaries lead, instead, to adaptation strategies of Indigenous inhabitants within the confines of the reduced territory?¹¹

It is obvious to us that answering such questions will require research on the agency of Indigenous groups and their aspirations. Mobilization to create Indigenous Territorial Jurisdictions (Herlihy, et al. 2021), assertions of sovereign agency through “paradiplomacy” (Álvarez and Ovando 2022), and international instruments such as the International Labor Convention 169 of 1989 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Nations, and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) of 2007, have articulated a new international Indigenous rights regime (Lightfoot 2016), invigorating some groups’ quest for reclaiming ancestral territory.

⁹ According to Rensink (2021, 6-7), some indigenous groups used the European obsession with international borders strategically and choose to straddle them in order to play one European power off against another (the Mohawk). He also claims that Indians learned they could escape the jurisdiction of law enforcement from one country by fleeing to the territory of another (the Cree). His discussion indicates a good deal of strategic interaction in adapting to European conceptions of international borders.

¹⁰ In fact, it could be that not even inter-state wars affect the cohesiveness of some Indigenous peoples. We believe that the very fluid and porous border between Chile and Bolivia, where Aymaras nowadays move back and forth without attention to the formal external border and where a great deal of contraband of cars (*chutos*) takes place, is the same area that Chile won over to Bolivia in the war of the Pacific, in the second half of the 19th century. Perhaps this means that the ancestral patterns of movement persisted beyond the war and Chile’s claiming of this territory?


¹¹ We suspect that some similar questions could be asked of the colonial period. As noted above, the colonial empires also imposed new borders (such as the viceroyalties) and had taxing and laboring schemes that affected Indigenous populations, not to mention overt violence or war against them and of Indigenous peoples fighting with each other as well. All of this does seem important to understand the subsequent processes of relationships between Indigenous peoples and nations during the republican period.

In addition, answering these questions will require a hard look at the contemporary border policies of states. It is important to understand how recent border control policies deepen the wedge driven between groups whose ancestral lands have historically straddled state borders. Heightened border security measures threaten traditional rights of free passage (Tonra 2006, Rensink 2021) that can affect contact, interactions, and common aspirations. Restrictive border crossing practices and requirements make it much harder for bisected groups to share cultural heritage through shared sacred practices. Maddison (2015, 157) gives the example of safe transport of sacred objects through border control. Securitized state borders represent “an assault on indigenous sovereignty as well as an assault on the cultural integrity of native societies” (Luna-Firebaugh 2002, 160). The extension of border fencing and walls between the United States and Mexico is viewed as an especially strong assault on Indigenous identities and freedoms: “Along with the toll on indigenous identity, the stewardship of lands at the heart of traditional indigenous culture is also at risk. Basic indigenous beliefs on relationships, stewardship, and compassion are being disrupted and denied by these U.S. border policies against southern indigenous peoples. Sacred sites are being desecrated by the Border Patrol, and access to such sites will be cut off if the double-layered fence is put into place” (EagleWoman and WasteWin 2008, 34-35). Part of recuperating ethnic identity is to interrogate international borders as legitimate constraints on the movement of a sovereign people (Adams 2009).

Conclusion

International borders are often thought to have a strong impact on peoples’ identities. An important research agenda would examine the effects of international border hardening on the identity of indigenous groups, who once thought of themselves as a single people. in Luna-Firebaugh’ words (2002, 162), “While the Blackfeet were originally one people, this artificial division began to erode their self-identity, and they have come to see themselves as separate people.” Bordering has consequences. Split Indigenous territories throughout the Americas – from the Navajos and Apaches in the present-day border between Mexico and the United States, to the Mapuche in Argentina and Chile – have been impacted by the process of nation-state creation. Is it possible to imagine a future of plurinational states (such as Bolivia since 2008, and perhaps Chile after the ongoing constitutional convention)? And if, in such plurinational states, the internal demarcations and authority of Indigenous peoples approximate the concept of self-determination, what would be the consequences, for both indigenous groups and for national polities? If taken seriously, would the reconstitution of pluri-state Indigenous nations, such as that of the Collasuyo nation, which would expand from southern Peru to central Argentina, threaten the stability of today’s states? Whether and how the Westphalian nation-state system might accommodate these imaginable futures is an open question.

Map 1: Tawantinsuyu Expansion of the Inka Empire, 1438-1527




Source: Mann 2011, 86.

Map 2: Tawantinsuyu in the 1530's




Source: Map of the territory of the Tawantinsuyu, at the time of the Spanish conquest. Elaborated by Carmen Medeiros and Radek Sánchez, 2022, using information from D'Altroy (2003, p.88), Nielsen (2020, p. 40), and Parsinnen (1992).

Map 3: Relocation of Ethnic peoples in the Valley of Cochabamba during the Inka Empire late XV and early XVI Centuries.



Source: Sánchez (2014, 101).

Map 4: Qhapaq ñan, or Inka trail during the late Inka empire.



Source: Bouysse-Cassagne, Therese. L'espace Aymara: Urcu et Uma. *Annales. Economies, Societes, Civilisations* 33 (1978): 1057-1080

References

- Adams, Rachel. 2009. "Before the Border: Indigenous Geographies of North America." *Continental Divides: Remapping the Cultures of North America* 29-48.
- Adelman, Jeremy, and Stephen Aron. 1999. "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History." *The American Historical Review* 104(3): 814-41.
- Álvarez, Gonzalo, and Cristian Ovando. 2022. "Indigenous Peoples and Paradiplomacy: Confronting the State-Centric Order from Latin American Transborder Spaces." *Territory, Politics, Governance* 1-21.
- Barr, Juliana. 2015. "Borders and Borderlands." In *Why You Can't Teach United States History without American Indians*, eds. Susan Sleeper-Smith, Juliana Barr, Jean M O'Brien, Nancy Shoemaker and Scott Manning Stevens. Chapel Hill NC: UNC Press Books. 9- 25.
- . 2011. "Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the "Borderlands" of the Early Southwest." *William and Mary Quarterly* 68(1): 5-46.
- D'Altroy, Terence. 2003. *The Incas*. Blackwell Publishing.
- Denevan, William M., ed. 1992 [1976]. *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492*. 2nd ed. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press.
- EagleWoman, Angelique, and Wambdi A WasteWin. 2008. "Fencing Off the Eagle and the Condor, Border Politics, and Indigenous Peoples." *Nat. Resources & Env't* 2333.
- Fenn, Elizabeth A. 2001. *Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82*. New York City: Hill and Wang.
- Goettlich, Kerry. 2019. "The Rise of Linear Borders in World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 25(1): 203-28.
- Greer, Allan. 2018. "Property and Dispossession : Natives, Empires and Land in Early Modern North America." Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Herlihy, Peter H, Matthew L Fahrenbruch, and Taylor A Tappan. 2021. "Regaining Ground: Indigenous Territories in Central America." In *The Oxford Handbook of Central American History*. 1-24.
- Koch, Alexander, Chris Brierley, Mark M. Maslin, and Simon L. Lewis. 2019. "Earth System Impacts of the European Arrival and Great Dying in the Americas after 1492." *Quaternary Science Reviews* 20713-36.
- Libecap, Gary D. 2018. "Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism." NBER Working Papers 24544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lightfoot, Sheryl. 2016. *Global Indigenous Politics. A Subtle Revolution*. New York: Routledge.
- Luna-Firebaugh, Eileen M. 2002. "The Border Crossed Us: Border Crossing Issues of the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas." *Wicazo Sa Review* 17(1): 159-81.
- Maddison, Sarah. 2015. "Indigenous Peoples and Colonial Borders. Sovereignty, Nationhood, Identity, and Activism." *Border Politics: Social Movements, Collective Identities, and Globalization* 153-76.
- Mann, Charles C. 2011 (second edition). *1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus*. New York: Random House US.
- Medeiros, Carmen. 2022. "Mapa del Tawantinsuyu en los años 1530." manuscript.
- Nielsen, Axel. 2020. El Tawantinsuyu: cosmología, economía y organización política. In *Camino ancestral Qhapaq Ñan. Una vía de integración de los Andes en Argentina*, Victoria Sosa et al. ed. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Cultura de la Nación. Secretaria de Patrimonio Cultural. 24-52.
- Parssinen, Martti. 1992. *Tawantinsuyu: The Inca state and its political organization*. Helsinki: SHS.

- Raffino, Rodolfo, and Rubén Stehberg. 1999. "The Frontiers of the Inca Empire." In *Archaeology in Latin America*, eds. Gustavo G Politis and Benjamin Alberti. London: Routledge. 167-83.
- Rensink, Brendan W. 2021. "Indigenous Peoples and Euro-American Frontiers, Borderlands, and Borders in North America." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History*.
- Sánchez, Walter. 2014. "'Indios buenos para la guerra.' Agencia (agency) local y presencia Inka en los valles de Cochabamba." In *Ocupación Inka y dinámicas regionales en los Andes (siglos XV-XVII)*, ed. Claudia Rivera. La Paz: IFEA and Plural editores. 99-122.
- Sanders, William T. 1992 [1976]. "The Population of the Central Mexican Symbiotic Region, the Basin of Mexico, and the Teotihuacán Valley in the Sixteenth Century." In *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492*, ed. William M. Denevan. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. 85-150.
- Sheets, Payson D. 2000. "The Southeast Frontiers of Mesoamerica." In *Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas*, ed. Richard Adams. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Tonra, Joshua J. 2006. "The Threat of Border Security on Indigenous Free Passage Rights in North America." *Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.* 34221.