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State or empire? The UK and its analogues, 1800-1925

1. Introduction.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, which was created in and after 1801 through the union of the British and Irish parliaments, was part of a European and wider network of multinational union states formed at (broadly) the same time, and in similar circumstances. In fact, British and Irish elites effectively exported the idea of union.

Moreover, the United Kingdom in the 19th century behaved like other European unions and empires (there was an overlap between the two categories); and in particular it behaved, in terms of the governance of 'subsidiary' nationalities, and the management of internal and external borders, very much like the most nationally complex of the 19th century empires, Austria, later Austria-Hungary or the Dual Monarchy. Understanding the governance, longevity and ending of the Dual Monarchy - all shed light on the governance, longevity and end of the UK.[1]

2. The UK, which was created in and after 1801, was part of a European and wider network of multinational union states which require comparison.

The United Kingdom had of course distinctive institutions and histories. So had these other, contemporary, union states: the UK after 1801 was clearly not (for example) Austria-Hungary after 1867. Austria had a much shorter history of constitutionally restricted monarchy while the UK had a much longer tradition of (at least) nominally representative and responsible government: the *Ausgleich* binding the Habsburg monarchy and the Magyar elites was clearly not the British parliamentary union of either 1707 or 1801. Nor did the UK correspond exactly to the other so-called 'united kingdoms' of early 19th century Europe and beyond. It is obviously important to highlight at the start that not only were these somewhat different polities and settlements – they were also each relatively fluid and complex polities[2].

But several additional points are worth emphasising in order to understand the value of comparison. First, the UK was part of a network of other united kingdoms across early 19th century Europe. There was in fact a proliferation of the idea and nomenclature of the 'united kingdom' during, and at the conclusion of, the conflict with Napoleonic France. We still (understandably) tend to focus in this period on the restoration or consolidation of empire and on the construction of the nation state. But this was also (risking a Hobsbawmian periodization) an 'age of union': at least four multi-national (and sometimes self-styled) 'united kingdoms' were created in the course of less than 15 years – the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1801), the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814), the United Kingdoms of Sweden-Norway (1814-15) and the very short-lived United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves (1815)[3]. There were other complex polities from this time – the creation of the Grand Duchy of Finland occurred in 1809, when Finland came to experience what was sometimes defined as 'home rule' autonomy within a form of union relationship with Russia. This was also an era

which saw the revitalisation of the complex composite monarchy, or union of crowns, that was the Austrian empire (1804) – a polity very much at the heart of British foreign policy, and one whose subsequent fate and recalibration (and especially the sweeping reform of 1867) proved to be of significant interest to, and a significant source of comparison for, Irish and British observers[4]. Indeed the great Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellén, talked of Austria-Hungary as being 'a multitude of Irelands': so did other observers[5]. There has also been, incidentally, and more generally, a taxonomic overlap between different forms of composite monarchy and the notion of 'empire'; and indeed this overlap, or blurring, was reinforced through the directions of British diplomacy in the early 19th century, and through the bolstering at that time of different forms of multinational union and imperial state.

Second, and while acknowledging the need for caution, there is a basis for meaningful comparison, a *Familienähnlichkeit* – even looking beyond the shared timings and contexts for the creation of these different union states. Each and all of these polities was rooted in the foundations and cultures of composite monarchy: all were (in fact) monarchies – where the crown occupied a central and binding significance[6]. All were also complex multinational polities which were characterised by militarily and economically dominant partners and 'subsidiary' partners.

And third, and last – contemporaries in the UK and continental Europe very frequently drew connections themselves: throughout the 19th century, but especially in the 1840s and after the 1870s, when the modification or repeal of the Irish union was on the agenda, Irish and British reformers looked naturally to other 'united kingdoms' as models and exemplars of change. In the 1840s Irish advocates of repeal looked to Sweden-Norway as a model for a recalibrated British-Irish union, while Irish unionists simultaneously pointed to the economic costs of broken union, as represented by Belgian independence[7]. In the 1870s and 1880s Irish and British home rulers looked to Austria-Hungary: both Gladstone and the founder of Sinn Féin, Arthur Griffith, saw the *Ausgleich* as a paradigm for British-Irish relations[8]. The most distinguished Anglophone writer on central Europe of the early 20th century, R.W. Seton-Watson, was a Scottish liberal with strong family links to Irish unionism – and he too applied his knowledge of Scotland and Ireland and their respective unions to his analysis of both Austria-Hungary and the successor states[9].

3. The UK exported the idea of union. The UK was not only part of a network of other union polities which spanned northern Europe in the early 19th century: the architects and supporters of that (Irish-British) union were also active in effectively exporting the idea of asymmetrical union into other areas of (especially) northern Europe – of creating greater state units and widening state boundaries in the interests of regional stability and military security (in effect in the interests of a reformed *ancien régime*).

Viscount Castlereagh, the Irish landowner who – with Pitt – was chiefly responsible (1798-1800) for the Irish-British union subsequently (after 1812) became the foreign minister of the United Kingdom; and he and a group of Irish landed supporters (appointed to a range of diplomatic, especially ambassadorial, roles) helped to bolster the ideas and structures of asymmetric union both within the UK and beyond[10]. This influence was decisive in shaping the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814-15 as well as the United Kingdoms of Sweden-Norway at the same time: with each British influence was thrown behind the idea of multi-national union, designed to contain both internal and external pressures[11]. In addition, British influence underpinned the creation of a further United Kingdom – that of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves, created effectively in 1808, but formally launched only in 1815[12].

Asymmetric union was designed both in Ireland and in its export form as a means of consolidating regional security – and as a constitutional mechanism for creating internal stability through modifying and expanding borders accordingly. Indeed, individual union states have been expressly described as efforts to rejuvenate the *ancien régime* – to recalibrate it for future survival[13].

4. Understanding the operation, survival and the final failure of the 'first' UK in 1921-22 is enhanced through comparative reflection on the life and death of other united kingdoms.

4.1. So, the contention here is that the birth of the UK in 1801 should be seen in the context of a wider contemporary pattern of multinational union states. Let me continue by suggesting in addition that understanding the longevity and failure of the unions of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is enhanced through comparative reflection; and I'd also suggest that the history and historiography of other unions serves to better inform our particular and detailed understanding of the unions of the UK. For the purposes of this essay, I propose to continue focusing largely (though not exclusively) on the comparison which chiefly interested many 19th century Irish and British commentators – that with Austria-Hungary.

4.2. Longevity. The very notion of the longevity of union is underpinned by the emphases within Habsburg scholarship: work on the Dual Monarchy and on the *Ausgleich* over at least the past thirty years eschews teleologies of irresistible failure (this work has a number of focal points, including Pieter Judson's formidable overview of 2016)[14]. In other words, the metanarrative for Habsburg Europe has shifted from how it grew ever more diseased and died (the journalist Wickham Steed, the long-serving *Times* correspondent in Vienna, talked in 1937 of the 'doom of the Hapsburgs') to, instead, how it adapted and held on[15]. This historiographical shift has value for the UK, where a combination of 'declinology' and nationally inflected teleologies (a combination similar to that recently dominant within Habsburg historiography) have been hitherto particularly influential. The UK, even in its failed Irish iteration (1801-1922), lasted rather a long time – and it is important (as with the traction of the Dual Monarchy) to understand why.

4.3. Malleability and survival. This shift within Habsburg scholarship has partly involved an emphasis upon the themes of malleability and survival – themes which have a relevance for the United Kingdom in the 19th century, including its Irish union[16]. These union polities often possessed an inner sturdiness, anchored in buttressing institutions and agencies; and they often benefited from some divided loyalties or (more commonly) popular passivity. As Wickham Steed said of the Dual Monarchy in 1913:

> 'In judging the affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, it is easy to underestimate its hidden powers of resistance, its secret vitality and the half-unconscious dynastic cohesion of its peoples. For these forces and qualities full allowance must always be made, even though the signs of their existence be overshadowed by symptoms of decrepitude and disintegration'[17]

Steed's comment might equally be applied to the unions of the United Kingdom. Both were often malleable polities, which proved adaptable (within certain limitations) to the challenges and exigencies of threat and change: the semi-confessional incorporating union of Britain and Ireland of 1800 developed substantially across the span of the long 19th century, gradually retreating from its oppressive church establishment (axed in 1869-70), gaining new electorates (1850, 1884-5), and effectively shedding an old and deeply contested pattern of land ownership (especially from 1881 onwards). Similarly, Austria-Hungary – and in particular Cisleithania (Austria) – proved able to generate stimulating new strategies to answer the challenges of class and nationality, whether through expanding enfranchisement or through the new provincial settlements in Moravia and Galicia and elsewhere mooted before 1914[18].

In general unions which survived, or which successfully managed transition and change, were characterised by cultures of dialogue: this was true until 1914 of the Dual Monarchy and the UK – and even Sweden-Norway (despite – or perhaps because of - its internal bickerings) survived for 90 years and managed its way into peaceful dissolution. The short-lived United Kingdom of the Netherlands, which collapsed in and after 1830, exemplifies the opposite condition – with top-down policies and a reforming but often unresponsive and unmoveable monarch (Willem I). Unions tended to break when cultures of communication failed - when dialogues between partner nations became *Staatsvolk* monologues.

4.4. Institutions. It has long been accepted – from the writing of contemporary commentators like R.W. Seton-Watson, Henry Wickham Steed, Oszkar Jászi (the Hungarian-born progressive politician and academic) onwards - that the Dual Monarchy survived because it possessed essential institutional bolsters for some of the time; though Jászi also emphasised that there were key fluidities, and that the centripetal could well become the centrifugal[19].

The mid 19th century Austrian revolutionary, medical doctor and political writer, Adolf Fischof, famously defined four Habsburg 'armies' upon which the state rested: his standing (military), sitting (bureaucratic), crawling (police) and kneeling (church) armies may be recalled[20]. Imperial and royal armies, for example, have often served to provide unifying agencies for the different nations of complex states, though at the same time it would be wrong to attempt any overly crude correlation. In general, however, multinational union armies and some forms of external conflict have served to bind unions such as the United Kingdom or the Dual Monarchy, while – conversely – the defeat, humiliation, subversion or politicisation of armies have all been disproportionately damaging. An expanding union state, with concomitant overarching bureaucracies, has sometimes served to deepen the linkages between its peoples and the union itself (different historians dwell on the important role of the post office in the UK and Austria-Hungary, for example); though dynamic unions of this kind may grow and strengthen while simultaneously invoking pushback through disrupting established social frontiers and firing nationalist opposition[21]. Both the Dual Monarchy and the United Kingdom had some trappings of the confessional state: Catholicism was central to Habsburg rule, while of course the union state of the 19th century was associated until 1870 with a parallel union church, the United (Anglican) Church of Great Britain and Ireland. In each the formation of oppositional national identities could be closely associated with alternative church loyalties – whether Catholicism in Ireland or Lutheranism within Czech and Slovak nationalism, or Calvinism within Magyar nationalism[22]. In both Austria-Hungary and the UK, as Jászi had observed in 1929, centripetal forces of these kinds could come to operate centrifugally[23]

4.5. Identities. Multi-national union states like the UK or the Dual Monarchy often harboured significant communities who did not identify strongly with any single nation or ethnicity, but who were instead characterised primarily by (for example) local identities or (alternatively) supranational loyalties including those who have been identified within recent work as 'non-national communities' – those who defined themselves outwith the vocabulary or taxonomies of nationalism. Much has been made of this concept within recent Habsburg historiography, but there is a case for applying it elsewhere, and including within the unions of the United Kingdom. It is also likely that these 'non-national' communities of the Dual Monarchy (and of the United Kingdom) are to be identified with the hybridities associated with identity inside colonial frameworks[24]. This would certainly make sense in terms of any conceptual overlap between notions of union and of empire.

These unions generally lacked, or failed to produce, an overarching binding identity. As is well known, the Dual Monarchy never generated an effective 'Austro-Hungarianness'. This, too, was the case in Sweden-Norway (1814-1905), where citizens were either Norwegians or Swedes, but never Swedish-Norwegian: the pan-national Scandinavianist movement of the mid-19th century might in theory have served to provide a form of unifying identity, but in practice it melted away after the 1860s [25]. And in the United Kingdom, while there was a single citizenship, and a single passport, and while there *was*

'Britishness', this (with its emphases on protestantism and Britain itself) did not effectively embrace Ireland or Irishness[26]. In each of these different unions, however, there were some compensating dynastic loyalties – to the houses of Habsburg, Bernadotte, Hanover, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha or (after 1917) Windsor. These could, and sometimes did work to create ties to the union state, including sometimes even in Ireland; but these were often identities or loyalties which were vulnerable to shifts both within the different ruling houses, and in the credibility and standing of their representatives, especially the successive crowned heads. However, *Habsburgtreue*, which has been so emphasised in terms of the Dual Monarchy, can be seen as balanced by a British *Hanovertreue* – or, indeed, *Windsortreue*. In fact it may be that Britishness itself should be understood less as a national and more effectively as a form of supranational dynastic identity, following the model of *Habsburgtreue*.

4.6. Dividing, ruling – and partition. Each of the polities, the Habsburg empire and the United Kingdom, practised policies designed to fragment opposition, and to encourage negotiation between centre and periphery, rather than between nationalities or communities at the periphery of power within the union or imperial state. In each there were clearly designated hierarchies of favour – from the *Staatsvölker* (Germans, Magyars, English) through the relatively or periodically favoured (Galician Poles, Croats, Scots) to those at the bottom of the hierarchy (Ruthenians, the Italians of the Adriatic Littoral, the Irish). Just as the stability of British rule in Ireland depended upon (and often received) local support and local agency, and just as these were periodically threatened by broad coalitions of dissent, so (for example) the perennial fear of the Habsburgs and their agents was that 'if the Croats were driven by reactionary Magyar policy into the arms of Belgrade, then the position of the monarchy would be one of real danger'[27]

In both Scotland and Ireland successive London governments sought to exercise power through the recruitment of influential interest groups or connections: in 18th century Scotland these included the family and clan networks around the Campbells, dukes of Argyll, and later the Dundas, Melville, connection; while in Ireland London exercised power from the 17th century through to the mid-19th century effectively through the Anglican landed elite (known from the late 1780s as 'the protestant ascendancy'). In Northern Ireland through much of the 20th century, until 1972, British power and patronage were exercised, largely exclusively, in association with the then dominant Unionist Party. The fundamental basis for the revision of the Austrian empire into Dual Monarchy through the *Ausgleich* in 1867 was the drafting of the Magyar elites into the co-ownership of the empire – and their often chauvinistic rule over the vast lands of the eastern empire, known as Transleithania. In both the United Kingdom in the late 19th century and in Austria-Hungary efforts to revise the constitutional settlement, and to recalibrate the distribution of power away from its existing beneficiaries, whether through home rule (Ireland and possibly Scotland) or 'trialism' (Austrians, Magyars and Slavs)– these periodically threatened the overall stability of the entire imperial edifice.

In managing ethnic and national division, and in stabilising boundaries and frontiers, centralised union states and empires have both commonly resorted to, or at least threatened, territorial partition[28]. The partition of Ireland, which was debated from 1912 and enacted between 1920 and 1925, was a case in point; but the Dual Monarchy was associated with earlier conversations on partition and borders. In 1890, for example, the Austrian Minister President, Taaffe —like Asquith with Ireland in 1914—was moving towards partition as a means of dealing with the (for him) particularly intractable national tensions of Bohemia (which, it has rightly been said, 'bore some resemblance to Britain's Irish problem'): Germans, who were roughly one-third of the population of Bohemia, wanted to divide Bohemia in two, but in 1890 Taaffe secured (what looked for a while like) an agreement—the *Punktace*—on the basis of apportioning the crownland into separate German and Czech administrative and judicial areas[29]. Discussion over the division of Ireland on the eve of the First World

War was part, therefore, of a much more complex array of similar discussions than the current literature fully acknowledges.

However, one striking difference between the Dual Monarchy and the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 20th century – a period of intense constitutional debate within both polities – was the relatively greater degree of imagination brought to the issue of managing national division by the Habsburg, as opposed to the British, authorities[30]. By 1914 the governing classes in Vienna appeared (on the evidence of deals in Moravia, Galicia and Bukovina), to be moving towards consociational models of national arbitration – and away from the territorial divisions now being contemplated by British ministers for Ireland.

5. Endings – the war to end union? It is now often argued that the Great War became the 'war to end empires'; and Habsburg historians generally unite in seeing the War (rather than any long-term morbidity) as the Dual Monarchy's proximate 'cause of death': war, it has been said, 'unmade the Habsburg state'[31]. If the United Kingdom and its unions are to be regarded as an archipelagic empire, why then did the First World War not fulfil a similar role here? Was the conflict in fact a 'war to end union'?

In several respects the War did, in fact, act to terminate certainly a version of the United Kingdom – and for many of the same reasons as in Austria-Hungary. By 1922 the UK, a nominal victor from the Great War, had lost one fifth of its territory as a consequence of the Irish War of Independence and the ensuing settlement – bequeathing (like the now disaggregated Dual Monarchy) a set of successor polities and redrawn boundaries. By 1922, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, laid down in 1801, was no more.

In both the Dual Monarchy and the UK war brought an end to the essential flexibilities in governance which had supported the stability of union and empire. Expressing this another way, war tended to bring an end to 'constructive unionist' policies in both the Dual Monarchy and the UK – and an end to the cautious engagement with moderate nationalist forces in each. Complementing this point, for both polities war tended to augment the central state and military authorities at the expense of national peripheries and civilian administration – and to augment the dominance of the dominant nationalities and the expense of 'subsidiary' nationalities. War tended to enflame mutual national suspicions within complex union states – whether German suspicions against Czechs, Slovaks and other Slav peoples in Austria-Hungary, or English suspicions against the Irish within the UK. This flammability found an expression in terms of action against national minorities – expressed in the suppression of suspect minorities within Austria-Hungary or (say) with the British response to the 1916 rising. In each polity there were dominant national suspicions of subsidiary nationality disloyalty – and indeed each had a version of the 'stab in the back' mythology, the *Dolchstosslegende*, which looked to the threatened internal subversion of the union war effort.

And, indeed, in each polity the end of the war brought the radicalisation of national minorities and the conversion of representation within imperial structures into independent national fora. In Austria-Hungary, from October 1918 onwards, diets in the crownlands were converting themselves into national assemblies. Similarly, in January 1919 in Ireland those separatists who had been elected at the UK general election of December 1918 assembled as an independent Irish national legislature, Daíl Éireann.

The Irish War of Independence (1919-21) is now increasingly seen as one of numerous 'small' wars which in effect served as a continuation of the Great War and its divisions[32]. There is a sense, too, in

which the Irish Free State, established in 1922, and Northern Ireland, established between 1920 and 1922, can be seen as successor states to the old United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, established originally in 1801, but radically restructured in 1921-22. And, indeed, like other successor states to the European empires, these states were an effort to carve out national territories from multinational unions – and to that extent were ultimately failures. Just as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other successors to the Dual Monarchy have been seen as fissile unions (and indeed were eventually redefined from centralised union states into federal unions) so Northern Ireland (with its unionist *Staatsvolk*, and its 'subsidiary' Irish national minority) can also be seen as a type of microempire emerging from the redesign of a larger, but failed, predecessor.

6. Conclusions.

In summary -

6.1 We should think about the unions of the United Kingdom comparatively – but particularly in terms of the legacies of composite monarchy across 19th century Europe, and in terms of the observations of contemporaries. Comparative approaches facilitate and crystallise an understanding of the survival and ultimate demise of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland across the long 19th century. For the purposes of this essay, the focus has been principally upon the UK and the Dual Monarchy – but the embrace might equally have been wider, and included other contemporary multinational union states[33].

6.2 The UK at the beginning of the 19th century was not just a union state. It was part of a network of contemporary multinational union monarchies, alternative self-styled 'united kingdoms'. It was also an effective exporter of political union: British diplomacy in the era of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was associated both with the support of multinational empire (Austria, Russia) as well as the related and proactive forging of complex union states in northern Europe (Sweden-Norway, the Netherlands). The British idea of union was embodied in the desire to reshape and restore the *ancien régime* both at home and overseas in the era of revolution and the nation state.

6.3 More specifically, the recent direction of Habsburg scholarship encourages an investigation into the bolsters and longevity of the unions of the UK. It also invites a closer scrutiny of the relevance of the idea of the non-national to the spread of identities within the union state – and perhaps a reassessment of Britishness as a form of dynastic loyalty comparable to *Habsburgtreue* in central Europe. Finally, the shape of imperial Habsburg government often bears a striking comparison to union government within the UK – the identification of national and ethnic 'hierarchies', the conjunction of science and policing through detailed knowledge gathering, the conscription of elite groups within the constituent polities of union and empire, the deployment of partial reinforcement through mixtures of coercion and conciliation, the monetising of cultural disputes, the encouragement of local division and exclusive dealing with the imperial centre, and the application or threatened application of new partition and new boundaries.

Throughout the 19th century British and Irish constitutional reformers looked to the multinational union states of continental Europe for models of change – and there was a symmetry here, given that several of these states had originally been shaped or protected by British union diplomacy. By the last quarter of the century these reformers saw in Austria-Hungary a particularly compelling exemplar of supranational amity. But they might well have been more careful about their wishes. For, if dualism in Austria-Hungary represented an aspiration for home rulers, then it also offered bleaker models of imperial governance to the political elites of the British union state.

[1] Much of the paper is drawn from more extensive reflections on European and other multinational unions contained within my study, *United kingdoms: multinational union states in Europe and beyond* (Oxford, 2023). I am grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for their support of my research and writing into these themes.

[2] The literature on the opportunities and risks associated with comparative history is vast, but see eg Jürgen Kocka, 'Comparison and beyond', *History and theory*, 42, 1 (Feb. 2003), pp.39-44; Deborah Cohen, 'Comparative history: buyer beware', in Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor (eds), *Comparison and history: Europe in cross-national perspective* (New York, 2004), pp.60-4; Phillipa Levine, 'Is comparative history possible?, *History and theory*, 53, 3 (2014), pp.331-47.

[3] See, out of extensive literatures, Theodore Jorgenson, *Norway's relations to Scandinavian unionism, 1815-71* (Northfield MN, 1935); Alvin Jackson, *The two unions: Ireland, Scotland and the survival of the union 1707-2007* (Oxford, 2013), Roderick Barman, *Brazil: the forging of a nation, 1798-1852* (Stanford, 1988), Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy and the Portuguese royal court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-21* (London, 2001); Stefaan Marteel, *The intellectual origins of the Belgian revolution: political thought and disunity in the kingdom of the Netherlands, 1815-30* (London, 2018).

[4] John Bew, Castlereagh: from enlightenment to tyranny (London, 2011), p.522.

[5] See Steven Beller, *Francis Joseph* (Harlow, 1996), pp.38-9.

[6] H.G. Koenigsberger, 'Monarchies and parliaments in early modern Europe: dominium regale or dominium politicum et regale?', *Theory and society*, 5/1, pp.191-217; John Elliott, 'A Europe of composite monarchies', *Past & Present*, 137/1 (Nov), pp.48-71; Andrew Mackillop and Micheál Ó Siochrú (eds), *Forging the state: European state formation and the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707* (Dundee, 2008).

[7] James Emerson Tennent, *Belgium*, two vols (London, 1841), pp.vi, x, 174, 234. See also, for example, Anon., *Essays on the repeal of the union, to which the Association prizes were awarded; with a supplemental essay recommended by the judges* (Dublin, 1845).

[8] W.E. Gladstone, *Special aspects of the Irish question: a series of reflections in and since 1886* (London,1892), pp.364-5; Arthur Griffith, *The resurrection of Hungary,* new edition (Dublin, 1918). See also James Loughlin, *Gladstone, home rule and the Ulster Question, 1882-1893* (Dublin, 1986).

[9] See Mark Cornwall and Murray Frame (eds) (2001). *Scotland and the Slavs : cultures in contact 1500-2000* (Newtownville, 2001).

[10] See, for example, Bew, *Castlereagh*; Dunbar Plunket Barton, *The amazing career of Bernadotte* (London, 1929).

[11] Sir Charles Webster, *The foreign policy of Castlereagh, 1812-15* (London, 1931), pp. 306-9, 387; Colin Lucas, 'Great Britain and the union of Norway and Sweden', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 15, 3-4 (1990), pp.269-78.

[12] Schultz, *Tropical Versailles*, pp.28-9.

[13] Schultz, *Tropical Versailles*, pp.2-4.

[14] Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg empire: a new history* (Cambridge Mass., 2016).

[15] Henry Wickham Steed, *Doom of the Hapsburgs* (London, n.d. [1937]).

[16] Jackson, *Two unions.*

[17] Henry Wickham Steed, *The Hapsburg monarchy*, new edition (London 1919), p.282.

[18] T. Mills Kelly, 'Last best chance or last gasp? The compromise of 1905 and Czech politics in Moravia', *Austrian History Yearbook* 34 (2003); Börries Kuzmany, ‚Der Galizische Ausgleich als Beispiel moderner Nationalitätenpolitik?' in E. Haid, S. Weismann and B. Wöller (eds), *Galizien. Peripherie der Moderne—Moderne der Peripherie* (Marburg, 2013)

[19] Oszkár Jászi, *The dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy* (Chicago, 1929), p.133.

[20] quoted often but see Beller, *Francis Joseph*, p.59; Judson, *Habsburg empire*, p.247; cf Steed, *Hapsburg monarchy*, p.90

[21] Patrick Joyce, *The state of freedom: a social history of the British state since 1800*, (Cambridge, 2013), pp.53-143; Bob Harris, 'The post office and the making of North Britain, 1750-1840', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, 3.1 (2023), pp.1-30; Judson, *Habsburg empire*, pp.337.

[22] Robin Okey, *The Habsburg empire, c.1765-1918: from Enlightenment to eclipse* (Basingstoke, 2001), pp.101, 108; Lilli Zách, *Imagining Ireland abroad*, *1904-45: conceiving the nation, identity and borders in central Europe* (London 2021) p.160; Robert Nemes, 'The uncivil origins of civil marriage: Hungary' in Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (eds), *Culture wars: secular-Catholic conflict in nineteenth century Europe* (Cambridge, 2003), p.316.

[23] Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy*, p.133.

[24] cf Tara Zahra, 'Imagined non-communities: national indifference as a category of analysis', *Slavic Review*, 69, 1 (Spring, 2010). See also Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and*

Germans? A local history of Bohemian politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton, 2002); Judson, *Habsburg empire*.

[25] Ruth Hemstad, 'Scandinavianism: mapping the rise of a new concept', *Contributions to the history of concepts*, 12, 1 (Summer 2018), pp.1-21; Ruth Hemstad, 'The United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden and the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1814-30: comparative perspectives on the politics of amalgamation and nation building', *Scandinavica*, 58, 2 (2019), pp.76-97; Jorgenson, *Scandinavian unionism*.

[26] Tom Nairn, *The break-up of Britain: crisis and neo-nationalism* (London, 1977); Tom Nairn, *The enchanted glass: Britain and its monarchy, new paperback edition* (London, 1990); Krishan Kumar, *The making of English national identity* (Cambridge 2003), p.3.

[27] Scotus viator [R.W. Seton-Watson], *Racial problems in Hungary* (London, 1908), p.415.

[28] The literature on Irish partition is vast, though the comparative literature is slighter (and comparisons with continental European empires slighter still): for a still-valuable starting point see T.G. Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: theory and practice* (London, 1984).

[29] Mark Cornwall, *The last years of Austria-Hungary* (Liverpool, 2002), pp.63, 79; Steven Beller, *The Habsburg monarchy, 1815-1918* (Cambridge 2018), p.185; Zách, *Imagining Ireland Abroad*, pp.55ff.

[30] John Leslie, ‚Der Ausgleich in der Bukowina von 1910: zur österreichischen Nationalitätenpolitik vor dem ersten Weltkrieg' in Emil Brix, Thomas Fröschl, und Josef Leidenfrost (eds), *Geschichte zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung: Gerald Stourzh zum 60. Geburtstag* (Graz und Wien/Vienna, 1991), p.136; Gerald Stourzh, *From Vienna to Chicago and back: essays on intellectual history and political thought in Europe and America* (Chicago, 2007), p.177; Judson, *Habsburg empire*, p.316.

[31] John Deak, *Forging a multinational state: state making in imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War* (Stanford, 2015) p.264; Robert Gerwarth, *The vanquished, why the First World War failed to end* (London, 2016), p.267.

[32] Gerwarth, *The vanquished*, p.267; Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (eds), *War in peace: paramilitary violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford, 2012).

[33] As in fact I have sought to do with my *United kingdoms: multinational union states in Europe and beyond, 1800-1925* volume.