

National Bankruptcy and social revolution: European Observers on Britain, 1813-1844.

Gareth Stedman Jones

I

Through much of the twentieth century, British economic historians were content to ascribe the origins of the notion of the ‘industrial revolution’ to Arnold Toynbee’s book, *Lectures on the industrial revolution in England*, which appeared in 1884. It was not until 1986 that Alon Kadish examined the sources of Toynbee’s use of the term, followed in 1992 by Donald Coleman’s attempt to fix the origins of the association of industrialization with catastrophe.¹ Coleman’s investigation led him back through Mill and Jevons to the 1875 French translation of *Capital* and then to Engels’ *Condition of the working class in England* of 1844. Coleman also noted the presence of the term in Jerome Adolphe Blanqui’s *Histoire de l’economie politique en Europe* of 1837 and in several other French and Belgian publications of the same period.

Coleman’s essay is to be applauded for its attempt to bring together economic and intellectual history, but his major conclusions were mistaken. Had he not halted at Blanqui and Engels around the end of the 1830s, he would have discovered that the ‘industrial revolution’ or, as it was initially phrased, ‘the revolution of industry’, began life as a positive term and that it was initially the coinage of the quite unromantic French revolutionary turned liberal political economist, Jean Baptiste Say.

Jerome Adolphe Blanqui - supposedly, the earliest well-known user of the term - was a close disciple and protégé of Say, and the successor to Say’s

chair at the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers.² The 'industrial revolution', as it initially emerged in France, was a descriptive or even celebratory phrase. Why was it that by the time it reached Toynbee, it had acquired such dark and uniformly bleak associations?

According to Arnold Toynbee, 'the essence of the Industrial Revolution' was 'the substitution of competition for the medieval regulations which had previously controlled the production and distribution of wealth'. Among its components were an 'agrarian revolution' which produced 'the alienation between farmer and labourer' and in the manufacturing world, the appearance of a 'new class of great capitalist employers'. 'The old relations between masters and men disappeared, and a "cash nexus" was substituted for the human tie'. Summing up his interpretation, Toynbee wrote, 'the *Wealth of nations* and the steam-engine...destroyed the old world and built a new one'.³ For Toynbee and those who followed him at the end of the nineteenth century, this coupling seemed self-evident. Steam-powered factories, the *Wealth of nations*, competition, the cash-nexus and the rise of pauperism formed part of a single phenomenon. Together, these elements made up what the Hammonds were later to call 'the bleak age'.

What had occurred between the discussion found in the writings of Say and Blanqui in the 1820s and 1830s and that found half a century later in the lectures of Toynbee? Coleman pointed to Engels' linkage of the 'industrial revolution' with the graphic and horrific picture of urban social conditions presented in his *Condition of the working class in England* of 1844. He then concluded that the catastrophist idea of the industrial revolution, taken up within English culture from the 1880s, was 'clearly a child of Romanticism'.⁴ This,

however, is at best a half truth. It is certainly true that Engels' approach drew some inspiration from Thomas Carlyle's *Past and present*. But otherwise, apart from his contacts with Manchester Owenites and Chartists, Engels' sources of inspiration came from the radical wing of the Young Hegelian movement in Germany, particularly the writings of Moses Hess, Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx. In Germany, Hegel and his followers were seen as the main enemies of the 'romantics'.⁵

Pointing to romanticism was therefore confusing and unhelpful. But Coleman was right to refer to the importance of Engels since in comparison with its usage by Blanqui and Say, Toynbee's 'industrial revolution' had become a composite term and Engels appears to have played a crucial intermediary part in this transition. In order to buttress his humanist and communist prognosis of the coming social revolution, Engels fused together two hitherto distinct, if sometimes overlapping, forms of discourse about the future of society. On the one hand, there was a debate which had developed around the notion of *Industrie*, mainly in France between the 1810s and the 1830s, a discourse from which the idea of 'an industrial revolution' originally emerged. On the other hand, there was the much wider preoccupation with the growth of pauperism, a common anxiety across Europe after 1815, but perceived as most threatening in Vormarx Germany, where it was associated by contemporaries with the abandonment of a feudal paternalist ethos in the countryside and the disintegration of estate society, during decades in which there was little significant industrial development.⁶ Engels treated the 'condition of the working class in England' as part of a French inspired narrative of 'the industrial revolution', but much of the raw material now incorporated into a supposed story of industrialisation (urban conditions,

underemployment, the rural exodus in England and Ireland, was more obviously inspired by the parallel German preoccupation with pauperism.

Toynbee's approach laid the foundations for a number of influential twentieth century accounts in which the supposed threat of political or social revolution in Britain between the 1790s and the 1840s was also principally attributed to the effects of 'the industrial revolution'.⁷ On this question as well, Engels' account provided a point of juncture between the continental literature of the 1810-1840 period and twentieth century historians. The expectation that Britain was heading for breakdown or revolution was not original to Engels. It was a common theme among European observers in the first half of the nineteenth century. Tocqueville, who did not himself believe that there would be an English revolution, wrote in 1833 that it was 'generally believed in France' that England was threatened 'by a violent and rapid change in its social state'.⁸ Furthermore, in both the French and the German discussions from the 1810s England figured increasingly as a negative example, as a nation heading for collapse.

But in these earlier discussions, the problems of Britain or England were not those of 'the industrial revolution'. Mechanization and steam-power, considered by contemporaries as extensions of Adam Smith's principle of the division of labour, when mentioned, were presented as solutions or mitigating factors in Britain's crisis. The problems which threatened to bring about breakdown or revolution were those of a backward socially irresponsible aristocratic state mired in mountainous debt and political corruption. It was only when German questions about pauperism and property were elided with French questions about mechanization and technological change, when employment in

factories was conflated with Carlyle's feudal and nostalgic lament about 'the cash-nexus', and when social and economic questions were no longer laid at the door of a particular form of state, but were treated as the work of a particular social class, a new ruling middle class with a supposedly distinctive *bourgeois* outlook, that 'the industrial revolution' itself could begin to be depicted in catastrophist terms.

It is striking that so many of these new connections should first have been made in French, Belgian or German commentary rather than in domestic discussion during this period. The strength and enduring interest of the most intelligent and incisive of these Continental writers stemmed not only from their ambition to distil what was distinctive about the British state, economy or society, seen in explicit or implicit contrast to their own, but also because of the unfamiliar angle of vision from which they viewed the country. This led them to question assumptions and practices which native inhabitants took for granted.

Their potential weakness resulted from the greater difficulty they experienced in assessing the relative value and reliability of the sources upon which they based their judgements. Hence the prevailing dangers of credulity, exaggeration, or the uncritical repetition of age-old opposition rhetoric. Continental observers did not write for the British, but for their own compatriots. If their observations were published, they appeared in their native languages and were conceived as political interventions in their countries of origin. For some - the more pragmatic and those nearer to the formulation of policy - the British model might contain a formula to be transplanted. For others, Britain offered a nightmarish vision of the future of their own country. After explaining why he had used England as an example, Karl Marx later famously remarked in his Preface to the first German

edition of *Capital* : ‘if, however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and agricultural labourers, or in optimistic fashion comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly tell him, "*De te fabula narratur!*"’.⁹ An understanding, therefore, of early nineteenth century French and German perceptions of England requires that they first be located within the local discursive traditions from which they emerged.

This essay will examine French and German views of Britain from the 1780s to the 1840s. Unlike the broad-ranging survey of what was presumed to be the English sensibility or mentality in Emma Rothschild’s discussion of ‘the English Kopf’, this essay will focus upon the particular social and economic characteristics and problems identified with the British case: in particular, those clustered around the idea of *industrie* in France, and around anxieties about *pauperism* in Germany. As examples of these different, if overlapping preoccupations, I have chosen Say in France and Hegel in Germany, for both developed at some length their respective analyses of the looming British crisis.

I will conclude with a brief reference to Engels’ *Condition of the working class in England*. Engels was important because, with the aid of Carlyle and other British sources, he turned the British case into a Feuerbachian fable. To do so, he re-assembled within a single narrative topics and styles of discourse which had originally been distinct. The result was an ominously enlarged conception of ‘the industrial revolution’, recognisably the precursor of that later adopted by a historiographic tradition running from Arnold Toynbee to Edward Thompson.

From the end of the seventeenth century, French observers of whatever persuasion could not be but astonished by the wealth and power of the newly emerged national rival across the Channel. 'England', wrote Boisguilbert in 1697, 'does not amount to a quarter of France, either in numbers of people... or in the fertility of the soil... Yet England in the last three or four years has just supplied near eighty million a year to the Prince of Orange without either reducing its people to beggary or forcing them to abandon the cultivation of their land'.¹⁰

In the course of the eighteenth century, internal peace, the increase of commerce, and the growth of naval power led to the ever greater expansion of this 'modern Carthage'. But for the first two-thirds of the century and even after defeat in the Seven Years War, liberal sentiment in France took a generally benign view of The United Kingdom. Basking in the praise of Voltaire and Montesquieu, Britain was viewed as a state in which liberty of the person was protected by a constitution based upon the separation of powers. In England, according to Montesquieu, sovereign power resided in the legislature. It was a republic masquerading as a monarchy, a view endorsed by the unease of many conservatives. It was also a state based on equality. All were supposedly equal before the law, the nobility were not exempted from tax, and nor were they separated from other classes by caste distinctions. Sons of peers entered trade, just as merchants entered the government.

Critics and sceptics pointed out that the English were a turbulent and unruly people, and that it was unlikely their internal peace would last. The Physiocratic school thought it inconceivable in the long run that a country with lands as vast or as fertile as France could possibly be surpassed by a country whose wealth was so dependent on trade. Quesnay also doubted the political

viability of Albion. How could loyalty exist in a universal republic of traders?

But after the American revolution opinion shifted. The hostility of supporters of the *ancien regime*, incensed by France's defeat in the Seven Years' War, began to be supplemented by a tide of criticism on the left. Earlier dissent among isolated critics, most notably Rousseau, Diderot, Mably and Linguet, now attracted attention. The English people were not free, their political and electoral system was corrupt, and press-gangs and the Wilkes case demonstrated that British civil liberties were partial and precarious. Britons used mercenaries to fight their wars. They were guilty of gross misgovernment in Ireland and India, and their treatment of Catholics revealed their professions of toleration to be hypocritical. Naturally, these criticisms were encouraged by Benjamin Franklin and the Americans in Paris during the war of independence, a war which France joined in defence of 'the freedom of the seas'.

Support for the Americans and the defeat of the 'haughty islanders' in 1783 not only restored French pride, but also regenerated French economic self-confidence. Whatever the impending financial meltdown of the French government, commercial growth and the expansion of French sea-ports during the eighteenth century had turned France into one of the world's leading trading nations, while in rates of increase of output per head in Britain and France remained very close.¹¹ Compared with the gulf which was to open up during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the technological gap between Britain and France was still small. Bouyed by hopes that France might now gain a considerable proportion of the American trade, the French lowered tariffs in the Eden Treaty with Britain in 1786.¹²

The aftermath of the American war also further undermined respect for

Britain's liberal reputation. The example of the new republican institutions of United States dulled the glamour of Britain's historic liberties. As Robespierre was to put it in 1789, 'the representatives of the French nation knowing how to give their country a constitution worthy of her and of the wisdom of this century, were not delegated to copy servilely an institution born in times of ignorance, of necessity and of the strife of opposing factions'.¹³ Despite being more highly taxed than other peoples, the British had accumulated a mountainous national debt. Their constitution was not balanced. As the *ancien regime* reached its point of crisis, radicals regarded English solutions with suspicion. It was pointed out that Britain's bi-cameral legislature would offer the king a double veto since, as Condorcet noted, the monarch would always side with the aristocracy against the people. The liberties of the English were the liberties of patricians. The English model had now become the resource of moderate liberals.

The revolutionary wars of the 1790s both heightened this contrast and extended it. After 1792, as in previous eighteenth century wars, the Pitt administration was accused of naval bellicosity, commercial and imperial greed, perfidy in dealing with allies, hypocrisy, and religious bigotry. Both in the eyes of Whigs at home and of French sympathizers abroad, Britain's reasons for embarking upon a war with 'the armed doctrine' of the French Revolution looked ideologically threadbare or sinister. Many agreed with the Whig leader, Charles James Fox, that it was simply an excuse to suppress domestic civil liberties. But after 1797 when Britain remained the only country still at war, the hostility broadened. Enmity towards Pitt's administration now began to engulf Britons as a whole. They were a people both personally and nationally incapable of thinking beyond their own material self-interest, 'a nation of shop-keepers' in Napoleon's

memorable citation from Adam Smith.¹⁴ During the Napoleonic wars, elements of physiocratic theory were incorporated in patriotic doctrine and encouraging precedents from the Punic wars constantly repeated as the newly constructed Continental system faced the British blockade. But the unprecedented scope of this war only made the final defeat at Waterloo more devastating. The demands of war had impoverished the countryside, conscription had disrupted labour markets, British naval supremacy had separated France from her previous global and colonial markets, while the blockade had cut the French off from crucial British advances in the application of steam-power and in the manufacture of cotton and iron. The French had to come to terms with the unthinkable: Carthage had defeated Rome.

From the battle of Waterloo until the revolutions of 1848 and beyond, it was difficult for any French person to write positively about British institutions.¹⁵

On the Buonapartist, republican or socialist left, the tone of hostility, indignation or condescension was unremitting. Characteristic was the socialist and feminist, Flora Tristan, who began her 1840 *Promenades dans Londres ou l'aristocratie et les proletaires anglais*,

London! What an enormous city! Its great size, out of all proportion with the area and population of the British Isles, calls immediately to mind both the oppression of India and the commercial superiority of England. But its wealth, a result of the successful use of force and fraud, is ephemeral; it cannot endure without reversing those universal laws by which, when the time has come, the slave will break his chains, enslaved populations will shake off the yoke and knowledge useful to men will be broadcast so that ignorance too may be freed.¹⁶

Similarly, the title of the 1850 study by the radical republican, Ledru Rollin, *De la decadence de L'Angleterre* was largely self-explanatory. His purpose was to 'open the eyes of my country and hold it back from the slope to the abyss'.¹⁷

More surprising, perhaps, were the strident tones adopted by those usually accounted to a moderate, liberal and even anglophile tradition. Thus Benjamin Constant spoke of English legislation as 'a permanent conspiracy of the rich and powerful class against the poor and labouring class'. Unfortunately the poor were too divided to make a revolution: 'this unfortunate class against whom all other classes conspire, can rattle its chains, but not break them'.¹⁸ Stendhal wrote in a similar spirit: 'the excessive and crushing labour of the English worker avenges us for Waterloo... Our survivors are happier than the English... In England, the nobles and the rich of every kind have definitively signed an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance against the poor and the workers'.¹⁹

It was not until well into the second half of the century that it became possible to adopt the warmer and more affectionate tone of Hippolyte Taine in his account of London: 'enormous, enormous - that is the word which recurs all the time. And, moreover, rich and well-cared for, so that they must find us neglected and poor. Paris is mediocre by comparison with these squares.' Taine concluded in measured terms that while the climate, the distribution of wealth and 'family and communal life' were superior in France, England's superiority consisted in its political constitution, its religion and 'its volume of acquired wealth and the greater powers of production and acquisition'.²⁰

III

Jean Baptiste Say was commissioned by the government of Louis XVIII to make

a fact-finding visit to England in 1814. His account is of special interest both because it was based upon first-hand observation and because it set out the French version of a liberal-radical diagnosis of Britain's post-war problems. French Liberals were keen to celebrate the advent of modern industry as a likely bulwark against the opposed forces of feudalism, corporate regulation and protection. But they had to tread carefully to avoid the charge of Anglophilia. One path which was to become increasingly common in the French approach, especially among conservative and legitimist critics of the July Monarchy after 1830, was to argue that machinery itself was mainly responsible for the growth of pauperism among the workers of Britain.²¹ The alternative, clearly presented in Say's pamphlet, was to argue that the machine and the steam engine were partial remedies for an otherwise crushing fiscal burden placed upon trade by the British state.

Say was famous both as a political economist and as an opponent of Buonaparte. His *Traité d'économie politique* of 1803 had established him as the foremost European champion of Adam Smith's system of commercial liberty against the (generally considered more patriotic) agriculturally-oriented economics of physiocracy. The debate about physiocracy in France was as much political as economic and for this reason Say's rejection of physiocratic theory was sharper and less equivocal than that of Smith. While Smith still conceded a special productiveness to agriculture, in contrast to manufacture where 'nature does nothing' for man,²² Say merged agriculture, manufacture and commerce within a composite notion of 'industrie'. Nothing in principle distinguished capital invested in agriculture from 'capital employed in utilising any of the productive forces of nature'. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of political

economy, what mattered about production was not the creation or transformation of matter, but the creation of utility.

These were not simply technical improvements in economic analysis. Say's argument contained a new political vision of society.²³ 'Industrie' was the sole legitimate activity in modern society, and 'the industriels' - the 'savants', 'entrepreneurs' and 'ouvriers' associated with the process of production - were its sole legitimate members. Say's 'industriels' were an economic specification of Sieyès' revolutionary conception of the nation, the 'third estate' as those who worked.²⁴ They were counterpoised to the 'oisifs', the non-working landowners and rentiers, whose property was the residue of conquest or occupation.

'Industrie' was an extension of what eighteenth-century writers understood by 'doux commerce'.²⁵ Peaceful productive activity linked together the interdependent parts of society, just as 'doux commerce' underpinned an emerging world of peaceful commercial exchange. War and exploitation, poverty and unemployment were the residues of a traditional aristocratic global order based upon conquest, violence, corporate privilege and protective tariffs. 'Say's law' - the denial of the possibility of general gluts - pre-supposed the harmony and complementarity of the international market, once institutional barriers were removed.

It is not surprising that Say's vision of peaceful and untrammelled commercial exchange displacing conquest and force did not please Napoleon. When changes were demanded for a second edition of the *Traité* in 1803, Say refused to comply. Under the First Empire, he published nothing more, devoting himself instead to the establishment of a cotton spinning factory in Normandy. Soon after Napoleon's fall in 1814, however, a second and substantially revised

edition of the *Traité* appeared. It set the terms not only of the liberal opposition to Buonapartism, but also of the liberal economic case against the protectionist and paternalist proclivities of the returning Bourbons.

Say's notion of 'industrie' was concerned with the unimpeded progress of industriousness, peaceful activity, liberal institutions and the march of the mind, not with the level or character of technology. There is therefore no immediate overlap between the 'industrie' of French liberals or St. Simonians and 'the industrial revolution' of modern economic historians. Nevertheless, the politics of 'industrie' could not but engender a positive stance towards the phenomenon of industrialization.²⁶ For industrialism was virtually defined by the belief that problems of inequality and ignorance, poverty and unemployment, were legacies of a feudal, military and aristocratic past. These social ills were the residues of force and fraud or of evil government, not the novel and unanticipated consequences of the progress of invention within the world of industry itself.

Say's pamphlet, translated into English in 1816 as *England and the English people* is interesting not only for its picture of industrial progress in Britain since 1789, but also for its attempts to explain British economic success.²⁷ What is striking, however, about Say's picture, is that industrialization was not presented as the result of the excellence of anglo-saxon liberal institutions (the jury system, freedom of the press etc.), but a by-product of the attempt by its unhappy people to escape the harshness of its taxes and the corruption of its financial management.

Say began by noting England's preponderance was not the result of military power, but of wealth and credit, a product of the strength of the 'whole economy'. During the war, while Buonaparte's conquests had turned the whole of

Europe into an enemy of France, English control of the seaways and its ability to subsidize continental allies had ensured a prodigious increase in its commerce and industry. The population of the towns had greatly increased and this had in turn benefitted farmers and landholders. According to Say however, these gains had been of little profit to the English people:

....taxes and loans ravished from them all its fruits. The taxes bore at once on the productions of all classes and took from them the most visible and certain proportion of their profits; and the loans absorbed the savings of those great dealers and speculators, whose situations enabled them to make the best advantage of circumstances.²⁸

Say went on to detail the huge defence budget and the amount paid out in sinecures and pensions. It was this pattern of expenditure which had resulted in the alarming increase in the national debt from around £1million in 1689 to £780 million in 1815. Adding interest payment to current expenses, Say estimated that 'government consumes one half of the income produced by the soil, the capital, and the industry of the English people'.²⁹

These charges in turn made English goods expensive. They increased the cost of living for those on fixed incomes and were 'the cause of the distress of the class of manual labourers'. In general it meant that the English nation was 'compelled to perpetual labour'. There were 'no coffee houses, no billiard rooms filled with idlers from morning to night... There everybody runs, absorbed in his own affairs. Those who allow themselves the smallest relaxation from their labours, are promptly overtaken by ruin'. Furthermore, consumption was curtailed, quality was adulterated, advertising was pushed to extremes and serious reading was in decline. Finally, crime - more widespread and frequent than

anywhere else in Europe - increased from year to year in line with taxes and the national debt. Its main cause was 'the economical state of a people' whose 'wants' were 'great in comparison with the means of satisfying them'.³⁰

But Say went on to concede that 'the necessity of saving on all charges of production' had also produced 'some good effects among many bad ones'. It had led to a perfecting of 'the art of producing' with striking economies of scale to be found whether in the provision of cheap milk or in the invention of the Lancaster system for the mass education of the poor. In particular, it had resulted in 'the introduction of machinery in the arts' which 'has rendered the production of wealth more economical'.³¹ Say noted the widespread use of threshing machines on large farms, but especially of the steam engine, 'the most advantageous substitute for human labour, which the dearness of articles of consumption has made so expensive'. He continued:

There is no kind of work which these machines have not been made to perform. They spin and weave cotton and wool; they brew beer, and they cut glass. I have seen some which embroider muslin, and churn butter. At Newcastle and at Leeds, walking steam engines draw after them waggons of coal; and nothing more surprises a traveller at first sight, than to meet in the country these long convoys, which proceed by themselves, and without the assistance of any living creature.³²

Say marvelled at the increase that had occurred in the use of steam during the war. Thirty years before, there had only been two or three steam engines in London, now London possessed 'thousands' and there were 'hundreds' in the great manufacturing towns. They were even to be seen 'in the fields' and 'works of industry can no longer be carried on advantageously without them'. Given a

plentiful supply of coal `which nature appears to have placed in reserve to supply the waste of forests... the inevitable result of civilisation', it was possible to foresee the future pattern of industry: `by the aid of a simple mineralogical chart, a chart of British industry may be formed. There is industry wherever there is coal'.³³

The problems of Britain were not those of industry, but of the ruinous level of its taxes and tariff barriers. The recent introduction of the Corn Law in order to maintain the high price of grain reached during the years of the war was likely to have adverse effects upon export prices. `The alternative is terrible. Either agriculture and the landholders are ruined if corn does not rise in price, or, if it does, then commerce and manufactures will be destroyed'.³⁴ Moreover an even worse problem loomed if the British state continued to maintain its present level of expenditure:

What would be said of a great landholder, possessing great activity and industry, who, by means of his land and the buildings with which he had enriched it, enjoyed an income of 170,000 francs, but who had had the misfortune of marrying an extravagant wife, who spent for him 260,000 a year; so that this poor husband, notwithstanding his genius and his incessant labour, is obliged to borrow 90,000 francs per annum to support his expenses? This is the state of England: I have only taken off four zeros.³⁵

The only alternatives were to continue to borrow and experience increasing difficulty in meeting interest payments or declare a national bankruptcy, at which point the whole political system would fall. But the only real remedy would be to lessen expenditure `by ceasing to embroil and agitate Europe, Asia and America'.

England's military expenditure had been greater than that of any other nation and it had only been sustained by an 'industry prodigiously active'. But much of that expenditure was pointless. An independent America had proved much more profitable to England than it had as a colony. Conversely, the expenses of conquering India outweighed the profits to be derived from it.³⁶ The lessons to be drawn internationally were the same as those applying locally. In both cases force and fraud were no substitute for industry. In the course of the nineteenth century, Say prophesied, 'the old colonial system will fall to the ground' since, 'sovereignty does not compel a people to buy what they cannot pay for, or what is not suited to their customs; and when they are offered what is agreeable to them, they buy it without being conquered'.³⁷

Say did not actually employ the notion of an 'industrial revolution' in his pamphlet on the English. He only developed the idea in his *Cours complet d'economie politique pratique* of 1828, largely in response to the writings of Sismondi. Sismondi in his *Nouveaux Principes d'economie politique ou de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population* of 1819, attacked machinery as responsible for the numbers of unsold goods and unemployed operatives in post-war Europe. He contended that machinery had created a situation in which 'Europe has reached the point of possessing in all its parts an industry and a manufacture superior to its needs'. It had also concentrated production in the hands of a small group of rich merchants who took no responsibility for the unemployment they had caused. The evidence that Sismondi produced to link machinery with the growth of unemployment was in fact rather slight. What was really important was the way in which he managed to link fear of machinery with a set of much deeper and more widespread anxieties to which it was only

marginally related.

Across Europe, these anxieties concerned the growth of 'pauperism' and that growth was intimately related, not to machinery, but to the major political events of the preceding thirty years - the French Revolutionary abolition of the corporate regulation of production by the 1791 Chapelier Law and the emergence of landless peasantry after the revolutionary legislation of August 4th 1789, the Enclosure movement and the removal of legislative protection of apprenticeship in Britain, the dismantling of guild regulation in the towns and the evictions of poor or landless peasants consequent upon the removal of patrimonial protection set in train by emancipation legislation of the Prussian Reformers.

Anticipating the case later to be made by Wrigley and Schofield, Sismondi linked these developments, especially the displacement of artisans and peasants by a swelling class of day labourers, to an increase of population consequent upon a fall in the age of marriage.³⁸ As he had already pointed out in his multi-volume *History of the Italian republics*, formerly competition had been regulated by the guilds and journeymen had only married on becoming masters.³⁹ Now there were no longer any restraints. The new conditions had bred a miserable class with no attachment to the established order, 'the proletariat' whose single vocation was to produce children. The problem of England, therefore, was not, as Say argued, that of a bellicose aristocratic state resting on corruption and colonies and heading for bankruptcy. It was rather that of a state built upon unlimited competition and a growing polarity of rich and poor guided by economists whose constant refrain was 'laissez faire et laissez passer'.⁴⁰

Say's response to Sismondi in the *Cours* attacked the idea that needs were fixed, and stressed that machines were expensive and therefore only introduced

gradually. He disputed the idea that machinery would create more volatile employment since the higher overheads of factories would tend to regularize work. More fundamentally, he used the examples of printing and cotton spinning to show how 'les revolutions de l'industrie' could transform the economy of nations and increase wages. The recent wage cuts in England to which Sismondi had alluded in 1827 were ascribed by Say to a recent wave of Irish immigration. Nor was there any truth in the implication that pauperism and industrialization went together. He cited the example of the Poor Law. 'There were scarcely any machines at the time of Queen Elizabeth and yet it was then that it was felt necessary to bring in that law for the support of the poor which has only served to multiply them'.⁴¹

In the years that followed, particularly after 1830 in France and after 1832 in Britain, a more self-conscious and explicit discontent on the part of artisans and factory workers had to be addressed. Say's successor, Jerome Adolphe Blanqui, acknowledged Sismondi's achievement in dramatizing the contrast between conspicuous wealth and extreme poverty in England. But his reaction to Sismondi's critique resembled that of Say. The progress of manufactures and the improvement of machines had been accompanied by a growth of national prosperity which had affected even the humblest workers. The promise of the emancipation of labour following the suppression of the guilds in France had been contradicted by the continuance of commercial protection which preserved privileges to certain groups and resulted in a 'true commercial feudalism'. Similarly, in Britain, despite the abolition of apprenticeship laws, 'patriarchal labour' had been transformed into 'industrial feudalism' in which the worker became anew 'the serf' of the workshop tied to the 'glebe of wages'. The root

cause of this situation was ‘the all-powerful aristocracy’ who found it simple ‘to impose upon labour all the burdens of taxation’.⁴²

IV

In eighteenth-century Germany, particularly the protestant north, there had been no comparable sense of national rivalry with Britain. On the contrary, from the mid-century, attempts to awaken cultural patriotism were almost exclusively directed at the French whether as the inspirers of local imitations of Versailles-inspired absolutism, as the language of courts, or as the promoters of classicist canons of taste. In search of an alternative, *Sturm und Drang* in the 1770s promoted Milton, Shakespeare, ‘Ossian’ and Shaftesbury; travel to England became more common and critics began to talk of ‘anglo-mania’. As a result of the alliance against the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs in the Seven Years’ War, there also developed among many Protestant Germans special feelings of affinity with England, which contemporaries called ‘Waffenbruderschaft’ (brotherhood in arms).

But above all, it was the presence of the Electorate of Hanover, whose monarchs also ruled Britain after 1714, which elevated the English constitution into a political ideal. Hanover preserved an aristocratically dominated estates system in a land surrounded by absolutist states. Its new university of Gottingen, founded in 1737, became renowned both for its relative freedom and its innovative scholarship, especially in law, philology and history. Gottingen was a natural centre for the dissemination of English ideas and many of its professors hoped that the local estates would evolve towards an English form of representative government.

Even in the pre-romantic era, an argument was developed for the special affinity between Britain and Germany, based upon common origins and ties of language and kin. Justus Moser, one of Gottingen's most influential alumni and closely connected to England by his work for the ruler of Osnabruck, Frederick Duke of York, was particularly important. He both pioneered a new approach to history as organic development and a new cultural and quasi-ethnic conception of the way in which the affinity between Germans and Anglo-Saxons should be understood. England was not simply the freest nation in Europe. England and Germany were part of the same family and were the embodiment of the same spirit of law, culture and politics dating back to the same tribes in the ancient German forest. Elaborating upon Montesquieu's association between feudal liberties and the Germanic, Moser treated England as the place where German traditions of liberty, especially those accretions of custom embodied in common law, had been enabled to survive and develop. Moser associated this argument with the power and stability of the English landowning class. But the argument could equally be developed in less aristocratic terms. According to other Gottingen historians, for example, Johannes von Muller or J.W. von Archenholtz, England's historic liberties had been won and secured by its third estate.⁴³

The French revolution was initially welcomed as a blow against absolutism and its rationalist supporters, foremost Kant, continued to treat it as a moral experiment in the formation of a constitution based upon reason. But once the Revolution had engendered an European war pitting the English against the French, it was not surprising that such an approach which was inherently dismissive of historical and empirical conceptions of right, should have turned sharply against English boasting about constitutional liberties. According to Kant,

Britain, despite its self-congratulatory libertarian pretensions, was wholly lacking in republican institutions. It was a rich corrupt state, which by using a mercenary army rather than a militia, and by employing the national debt to support its external affairs, was associated with ‘ease in making war’. Despite a constitution in which the will of the monarch was limited by two houses of parliament, the people of Great Britain lived in reality under an absolute monarchy.

But Kant’s position was increasingly isolated. In most cases, early support for the revolution was progressively blunted, as war with Britain, the attack upon corporations, the assault upon the aristocracy and church, and the terror reinforced the Hanoverian case.⁴⁴ Burke’s *Reflections on the revolution in France* was rapidly translated into German by Frederick Gentz, while a philosophical argument attacking Kant for treating the Revolution as the practical application of his ethical rationalism was mounted by another secretary to the Bishop of Osnabruck, A.W.Rehberg.⁴⁵

The Hanoverian argument in defence of the rights of estates and the preservation of historic liberties had originally been directed against ‘the machine state’ of Frederick the Great’s Prussia. But after the mid-1790s the epithet was extended to the revolutionary republic in France.⁴⁶ Both governments relied on centralized power and abstract laws which disregarded tradition and history. Champions of Britain did not put their main emphasis upon parliament, which would have raised questions about the corruption of the electoral system and the incomprehensible battle between factions or parties. Instead, Britain was celebrated for its historic preservation of common law, civil liberties, and its strong tradition of local self-government. As the ancient historian and Prussian diplomat Georg Niebuhr wrote, ‘freedom rests disproportionately more upon

administration than upon the constitution'.⁴⁷ It was this combination, supposedly responsible for the strength of English patriotism, that another ex-Göttingen, student, the Prussian reforming chancellor, Freiherr von Stein, attempted to promote with his *Stadteordnung*, restoring municipal self-government after the crushing defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1807.

With the end of the Napoleonic wars, however, interest in Britain rapidly diminished. Britain's postwar domestic policies, resistance to calls for political and legal reform, regressive taxation, protection of the agricultural interest, apparent indifference to the plight of the poor and restriction of civil liberties did nothing to strengthen the hand of Prussians arguing for representative government and 'organic' reform. Britain's foreign policy was inconstant and indecisive. Castlereagh did little to restrain the repressive turn of Metternich announced by the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819. On the other hand, Canning outraged conservatives by lending support to independence movements in Latin America and liberal movements in the Mediterranean.

The 'Hanoverian' arguments of the war years had been for moderate 'organic' reform, not for conservatism. There had been general support for equality before the law, representative government and the gradual removal of aristocratic privileges. Just as in economic policy, there had been advocacy of commercial society and the political economy of Adam Smith. But the Napoleonic era also witnessed the emergence of an altogether more self-consciously reactionary school of thought, for whom the economic liberalism of Smith and the politics of the rights of man went together.⁴⁸ Conservatives of this kind wasted no time in abandoning the English model. According to Adam Müller, writing in 1816:

We erred, during the hopelessness of 1806-1812, in taking England to be the actual foundation of European liberty rather than *just* a base and supply point of it; we estimated the power of political thinking in England too highly, that of the continent too little.⁴⁹

Moderates like Niebuhr were also disenchanted. He had once dreamt of a confederation of 'free Germanic states'. But he was depressed by Britain's post-war financial problems and lack of political leadership. The years after 1823 he described as an 'infamous period' and even his faith in English institutions of local government began to fail. Among liberals and radicals, the decline in interest in Britain was even sharper. Appeals to historic liberties and organic development had generally been appropriated by conservatives, particularly by Savigny and the historical school of law. Liberal and radical constitutional demands were framed overwhelmingly in terms of reason and natural rights. The hopes of reformers were focussed, not upon the obscure antipathies between Whigs and Tories in Lord Liverpool's Britain, but upon the confrontation between liberals and ultras in Restoration France.

V

The general trajectory of Hegel's thinking about Britain followed that of his contemporaries. As a theology student at Tubingen, he, together with Schelling and Holderlin, shared an initial enthusiasm for the events of 1789. But by 1800, as an academic at Jena after serving as a private tutor in a succession of homes in Berne and Frankfurt, Hegel had adopted a position which drew upon Montesquieu and the Hanoverian approach. In an unpublished essay, 'The German Constitution', written between 1798 and 1802, Hegel treated feudalism

as a common European form originating in ‘the forests of Germania’ and engendering a number of different political outcomes, including despotism in France and an institutionalized anarchy in the Holy Roman Empire. Like Moser, Hegel believed that this Germanic form had found its most developed expression in England in a constitutional government capable of reconciling the liberty of its citizens with the functioning of a modern commercial society. England was praised as an organic alternative to the ‘machine states’ of Prussia and France. During the war years, Hegel was particularly impressed by the English capacity for patriotism. In an early pamphlet written in Berne, he had declared an admiration for the jury system and other British political institutions. Together with dynamic industry and global commercial energies, these accounted for ‘the famous national pride of the English people’. In the early post-war years, his admiration remained. In his first version of ‘The Philosophy of Right’, given as a lecture course in Heidelberg in the winter of 1816-1817, Hegel emphasized the civic and educational value of publicizing parliamentary debates and remarked upon ‘how vastly more advanced the English people are than the German’.⁵⁰

But thereafter, like other Prussian and German reformers, Hegel became increasingly qualified in his references to England. His last essay, written in 1831 within days of his death, for the official Prussian journal, the *Allgemeine Preussische Staatszeitung*, was entitled, ‘On The English Reform Bill’, and was explicitly critical of the English polity. Hegel’s shift of position is particularly interesting because his anxieties focussed primarily upon England’s social and economic development and the problem of ‘pauperism’.

Hegel was an informed observer of British social-economic problems. During his time in Frankfurt and Jena between 1798 and 1804, he made a detailed

study, both of the *Wealth of Nations* and of Sir James Steuart's *Principles of political economy*. Although tempted to make the journey in 1826, Hegel never visited Britain, but he was a close reader of the English press. This can be seen from the surviving notes of his reading, especially those of the *Edinburgh and Quarterly* reviews around 1818-1819 and of the *Morning Chronicle* during the 1820s and during the Reform Bill crisis of 1830-1831. His interest in Britain was not only long sustained, but also attentive to relevant detail. It appears, for example, that he possessed a good grasp of the differences between the statutory English poor law and the voluntary Scottish system of poor relief managed by the church. He was even apparently aware that until recently Scotland had permitted a form of licensed begging, a fact he probably picked up from a reading of Sir Walter Scott's *Antiquary*.⁵¹

Hegel's shift in tone in his observations about Britain around 1819 was not just a response to the stagnation of European markets or to discontent and repression in Britain. It was also probably the result of reading Sismondi. This shift can be plotted from surviving student transcriptions of the lectures Hegel delivered each year on 'The Philosophy of Right' during this period. In 1817 in Heidelberg, the first time he delivered these lectures, his tone was positive. Hegel generally followed Adam Smith, but sometimes Hegel's conclusions were more optimistic. Thus, he agreed with Smith that one of the negative results of the modern division of labour was the stupefying effects of repetitive work upon the operative. But unlike Smith, he thought the problem could be solved: 'once factory work has reached a certain degree of perfection, of simplification, mechanical human labour can be replaced by the work of machines, and this is what usually comes about in factories. In this way, through the consummation of

this mechanical progress, human freedom is restored'.⁵² The contrast in tone, when he delivered the lectures in Berlin in the winter of 1819 is noticeable. There is no reference to the restoration of human freedom, instead a stark description:

Wealth accumulates in the hands of the owners of factories...With the accumulation of wealth, the possibility for further extension of the enterprise through the accumulated capital becomes even greater. The owner of large capital can be satisfied with smaller profits than those whose capital is more limited. This is one of the main reasons for the greater wealth of the English.

With the amassing of wealth, the other extreme also emerges - poverty, need and misery. In England, the work of hundreds of thousands of people is being carried out by machines. Inasmuch as the industry of any country extends its products into foreign lands, the welfare of single branches of industry is becoming exposed to many accidentalities..⁵³

But Hegel did not accept Sismondi's position on machinery. In the published version of the *Philosophy of Right*, the political economists with whom he associated himself were Smith, Ricardo and Say.⁵⁴ In the 1822-1823 version of his lectures, his position seems close to Say. Referring to England where machines had been destroyed by 'breadless workers' (presumably the Luddites) he commented, 'men can be occupied in something better than work which machines are capable of performing'.⁵⁵ Similarly, Hegel did not appear to consider the threat of unemployment due to machinery insurmountable. In 1824, he simply remarked, 'the workers, particularly the factory workers, who are deprived of their subsistence by machines, quickly become discontented and new positions must be opened to them'.⁵⁶

If reading Sismondi in 1819 was a turning point in Hegel's attitude to England, it was not because it led him to take a less positive view of mechanization or industrial progress. Nor did it turn him against Smith's conception of commercial society and the continued development of the division of labour. What appears to have impressed Hegel most powerfully were Sismondi's strictures against laissez faire and his emphasis upon the need for some form of protective and corporate framework to replace feudal protections in the countryside and guild regulation in the towns. In subsequent writings, Hegel never shifted towards an anglo-phobic position. Even in his lectures on 'The Philosophy of History' delivered in the late 1820s, Hegel continued to classify the English among the Germanic peoples. Commenting on English politics in *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel continued to recognise that despite 'what has always been regarded as the corrupt phase of a republican nation' - the rule of a Parliament which had been elected through bribery - the English system had 'the advantage of making a government possible - i.e. a majority of men in Parliament who are statesmen.'⁵⁷ Nevertheless, from around 1819, Hegel was increasingly critical of the historic liberties of the English which he and so many others in Germany had so admired during the years of Thermidor and Napoleon. As he later remarked, 'the peoples of the Continent have allowed themselves to be impressed for so long by declamations about English freedom and by that nation's pride in its own legislation'. But these 'constitutional rights', he continued, 'have retained that form of private rights which they originally possessed, and hence also the contingent nature of their content'.⁵⁸

More particularly, he now realized the danger of the unrestricted exercise of these liberties in the social-economic sphere and began to consider it necessary

to counter English-based claims that, 'with freedom of enterprise, business-life flourishes' or more specifically that, 'industry flourished better after the removal of corporations'.⁵⁹ 'Experience tells us the contrary', Hegel insisted. The example of England should not be used since 'unlike every other people, England has the whole world as its market'. Equally however, it possessed 'the most monstrous poverty and rabblement (*Pöbelhaftigkeit*) and a large part of this sickness is to be attributed to the removal of the corporations'.⁶⁰ While people complained about the way in which the old guilds abused their monopoly position, both in England and in France, freedom of enterprise had produced a worse situation. 'In England large capitalists so oppress the others' that whole branches of industry came into the hands of a few, who possessed no authorised monopoly, only that bestowed by their large capital 'and this is the worst of all monopolies'.⁶¹

It used to be thought that Hegel's discussion of 'the rabble' in the *Philosophy of Right* was a rather eccentric way of describing industrialization and the emergence of a new industrial proletariat. More recently, however, it has become increasingly clear that Hegel was pointing towards something different.⁶² Hegel was perfectly aware of the possibilities of the new industrial world. In the winter of 1824-1825, he summed up its significance by stating, 'the spiritual result is that man allows machines, weaponry, steam, furnaces etc. to step into his place and simply superintend them'.⁶³ It is therefore clear that he was not thinking about modern industry, when he cited as two empirical examples, 'the rabble' London and the lazzaroni of Naples. The paragraphs discussing 'the rabble' in *The Philosophy of Right* were not intended as a prophecy about the industrial future, but as a warning about 'the need to prevent a rabble from

emerging'.⁶⁴

Hegel believed that the poor had a right to relief in the form of gainful employment because they no longer had access to land. 'The whole earth is occupied and they have in consequence to rely on civil society'.⁶⁵ Individuals were denied the 'natural' means of acquiring property and at the same time could no longer expect significant help from their kin. They were dependent upon employment. But commercial society was volatile and changes in individual fortunes could be arbitrary. It was for this and other reasons that civil society must assume the functions of a 'second family'.

England became the example of a nation which had dismantled the moral and juridical framework necessary to civil society; and pauperism was its alarming and demoralizing price. Hegel noted that the result had been the growth of a poor-rate amounting annually to nine or ten million pounds, 'far more than the whole state revenue of Prussia'. The creation of this 'rabble' was frightening, it was 'the diseased part of an England, which is otherwise so flourishing'.⁶⁶ In particular, those receiving relief were supported without having to work in return, a fact contrary 'to the principle of civil society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and honour among its individual members'. But the alternative of making them work would only exacerbate the problem of overproduction and unemployment, which had led to the demand for relief in the first place. These, then, were 'the results achieved by poor-rates, boundless donations, and equally limitless charity, and above all by the abolition (*Aufhebung*) of the corporations'.⁶⁷

Once it is made clear that Hegel's anxieties about England were not part of a failed attempt to grasp the consequences of industrialization, the analysis of England put forward in his last text, 'On the English Reform Bill' makes much

more sense. Indeed, it ceases to be a curio, and becomes a text of major importance.⁶⁸ For Hegel was concerned with England's place in what for him was a far broader and more epochal transformation, in which France and Germany were also involved. This was what he called 'the moment of transition from feudal tenure to property'. It was a moment in which the opportunity ought to have been taken 'to give the agricultural class the right to own land'.⁶⁹ But this had not happened. For, '

...however enormous the contrast is within England between immense wealth and utterly abject poverty, there is an equally great - or perhaps even greater - contrast between, on the one hand the privileges of its aristocracy and the institutions of its positive right in general, and on the other, legal relationships and laws as reshaped in the more civilised states on the Continent and principles which, inasmuch as they are based on universal reason, cannot always remain so alien even to the English mentality as they have done hitherto'.⁷⁰

In part, Hegel's attitude to English common law was not unlike that of Bentham. In the years after 1815, there was a Europe-wide debate about the codification of the laws. In Germany, Hegel, Thibaut and others were pitted against the German Historical School of Law, represented most powerfully by Karl Savigny, who like Burke, fulminated against the shallow and ahistorical rationalism of enlightenment legal codes. Hegel's criticism that in England, 'constitutional rights have retained that form of private rights which they originally possessed' was clearly intended as an argument against the German anti-codifiers led by Savigny. But the social dimension of Hegel's concern differed from that of English philosophic radicals. For Hegel's particular anxiety

was that the English poor lacked ‘material rights’ and he was surprised that ‘the so-called practical sense of the British nation’ seemed little affected by any need for them. In part, this was because of ‘that selfishness which permeates all classes of the people’;⁷¹ in part, because ‘national pride in general prevents the English from studying or acquainting themselves with the advances made in other nations in developing their legal institutions’.⁷² But above all, ‘England has lagged so conspicuously behind the other civilized states of Europe in institutions based on genuine right for the simple reason that the power of government lies in the hands of those who possess so many privileges which contradict a rational constitutional law and a genuine legislation’.⁷³

In England itself, the condition of the poor was still bearable. ‘Though disqualified from ownership of land and reduced to the status of leaseholders or day-labourers, they do find some work as a result of the wealth in England in general, or in its huge manufacturing industry in times of prosperity. But it is to a greater extent the poor law, by which every parish is obliged to look after its poor, that preserves them from the consequences of extreme deprivation’.⁷⁴ In Ireland, on the other hand, the landlords had ‘disclaimed all obligation to provide for the subsistence of the populace which tills the land they own’. They sometimes evicted thousands and there existed no poor law to offer them subsistence.

Although Hegel accepted a number of the standard arguments for Parliamentary Reform, his prime concern was whether a reformed Parliament would be more likely to address these questions about ‘material rights’. He was pessimistic. Continental advances in ‘the scientific treatment of the law’ ensuring an orderly transition from ‘an earlier legislation based solely upon positive right

to one based on principles of real freedom' had been achieved through 'the broad vision of princes in making such principles as the welfare of the state... into the guiding light of their legislative activity'.⁷⁵ But in England, where the power of government effectively lay in Parliament, the crown had been in decline since the eighteenth century and no clause of the Bill proposed to restore its former position. In consequence, there was also no trained civil service to implement social reform. German civil servants, even those of noble birth, were trained through 'theoretical study, scientific education, practical training and experience'.⁷⁶ But England's rulers appeared unaware of the value of 'cultivation of science' as a requirement of government. This meant that if, as a result of the Reform Bill, the balance of power between aristocracy and people shifted, 'no superior intermediate power would stand between the interests of positive privilege and the demands for real freedom in order to restrain and mediate between them'.⁷⁷ Some believed the Bill would give even more power to landed property. Then, the same thin band of talent would continue to front 'the crass ignorance of fox-hunters and rural gentry' and 'parliamentary legislation' would 'remain in the hands of that class whose interests... are bound up with the existing system of property rights'.⁷⁸

The alternative was even worse. The Duke of Wellington had expressed the fear that the men at present charged with public affairs might be replaced by different men, shopkeepers, and that Reform might introduce into Parliament egalitarian ideas, opposed to the existing propertied class, as had occurred in France. In Germany, there had been a gradual and orderly transformation of old legal relationships based on positive right into those based on reason and freedom. But in England, there had scarcely been any change. England, therefore,

‘might well have cause to fear the greatest disruption of its social and political fabric’ as the result of calls to introduce such principles. What Hegel referred to as ‘novi homines’, might find in these principles ‘the strongest support for their ambition and popular appeal’. As a new parliamentary opposition, these ‘new men’ might push for the implementation of these principles ‘not in their concrete and practical truth and application, as in Germany, but in the dangerous shape of French abstractions’. ⁷⁹ It would introduce a dangerous conflict between ‘hommes d’etat’ and ‘hommes a principes’, as had occurred at the beginning of the French Revolution. Simple principles like equality could then be used to ‘produce a dazzling effect upon the reason of the masses’. Hegel’s ultimate fear was that ‘the new men’ would appeal to the seething discontent within the agricultural class, deprived of access to land or employment, without political rights and become a ‘rabble’ driven to ‘inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government’.⁸⁰ In other words, if radical reformers, blocked in Parliament, were ‘misguided enough to look to the people for its strength’, they would inaugurate, not a reform, but a revolution’.⁸¹

The analyses of Britain’s condition produced by Say and Hegel were in important respects diametrically opposed. Say thought that the process of deregulation of industry and commerce had not gone far enough and that there remained too many privileged groups and corporations enjoying lucrative protected positions. Hegel thought that although it was right to remove the privileges of the guilds, a corporate framework should have been renewed rather than simply dismantled, and that the lack of acknowledgement on the part of Britain’s rulers that the poor possessed any ‘material rights’ was socially and politically dangerous. Both agreed, however, that the British problem was that of

a state governed by a selfish, ignorant, socially backward and financially irresponsible aristocracy. Both, furthermore, were careful to distinguish the social and political sources of the growth of pauperism from questions surrounding machinery, steam-power and the progress of industry. It was because Sismondi had suggested that steam, factories and machinery were responsible for overproduction, unemployment, falling wages and the proliferation of a socially rootless proletariat that Say first devised his notion of 'revolutions of industry'. As followers of Adam Smith, both Say and Hegel considered that insofar as the problems of the landless poor or of rural and urban pauperism and the progress of British industry were interconnected, it was that the latter might alleviate the former. Mechanization would replace dull and repetitive work associated with an advanced stage in the division of labour; and in the long run - as Say's example of the invention of printing was designed to demonstrate - would produce massive increases, both in the volume of employment and in the standard of living.

VI

At the end of November 1842, eleven years after Hegel's thoughts on the Reform Bill, the twenty-two year old Engels arrived in England. He had no doubt that the social revolution in England was imminent and was therefore astonished at the sang-froid of the natives. 'Put it to an Englishman and he will give you a thousand excellent reasons to prove that there can be no question at all of a revolution'. The basis of Engels' expectation were not unlike those of Hegel. Only to 'the obstinate Briton' did a revolution seem impossible in 'a state like England, which by virtue of its political exclusiveness and self-sufficiency has

finally come to lag some centuries behind the Continent, a state which sees only arbitrary rule in freedom and is up to its neck in the Middle Ages'. Only the Briton could fail to see why 'such a state should not eventually come into conflict with the intellectual progress that has been made in the meantime'. 'Is there any other country in the world', he continued, 'where feudalism retains such enduring power... Is the much-vaunted English freedom anything but the purely formal right to act? And what laws they are! A chaos of confused, mutually contradictory regulations... not in accord with our times'.⁸²

Lighting upon another stereotype common among continental observers of 'the Nation of shopkeepers', Engels explained, 'among the Whigs and Tories, people know nothing of struggles over principles and are concerned only with conflicts of material interests'. It was therefore necessary 'to do justice to this aspect as well'. England, Engels maintained, was 'by nature a poor country, apart from coal, iron and 'some lush pasture land', lacking in fertility or other natural riches, and was therefore entirely dependent on trade, shipping and industry. Such a country could 'remain at the heights it has reached, only by constantly increasing industrial output'. It also had to keep out foreign industrial products by prohibitive import duties. England, he concluded, was caught in 'the contradiction inherent in the concept of an industrial state': home producers wanted continual increases in import duties, while home consumers demanded the abolition of protective tariffs.⁸³ A few weeks later, Engels conceded that 'when the English worker is employed, he is satisfied'. But the problem was the volatile nature of employment in 'the industrial state'. 'England with her industry has burdened herself not only with a large class of the unpropertied, but among these always a considerable class of paupers which she cannot get rid of'.⁸⁴

Engels' picture of England in 1842 was certainly not primarily the result of following the evidence of his senses.⁸⁵ A trip to England two years earlier, including a railway trip from London to Liverpool, had elicited a quite different set of impressions: 'Oh, there is rich poetry in the counties of Britain! It often seems as if one were still in the golden days of merry England and might see Shakespeare...his baroque, uncouth rustics, his too clever schoolmasters, and his deliciously bizarre women, all belong basically to merry England'.⁸⁶ It is of course true that in 1842 England experienced one of the worst industrial depressions of the nineteenth century. But that was not the immediate source of Engels' revolutionary expectations.

More relevant was the part played by Moses Hess. It was Hess, at that time the foreign editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* in Cologne, who had encountered Engels on his way to England and claimed to have converted him to 'communism'. Hess's vision of 'communism', to which at that time Engels certainly subscribed, was outlined in his book, *The European Triarchy*. He argued that the emancipation of mankind would be the task of three nations. Germany, the land of the Reformation, was to realize spiritual freedom. France, the country of the great revolution of 1789, was to attain political freedom. England was now on the verge of social revolution as a result of the mounting contradiction between 'pauperism' and 'the money aristocracy'. Its task was to realize social equality. Its revolution would be 'social' because, as he stated in the *Rheinische Zeitung* in the summer of 1842, industry had passed from the hands of people to the machines of the capitalists. Commerce had become concentrated in the hands of 'capitalists and adventurers (i.e. swindlers)'. Through primogeniture, the land had fallen into the hands of 'a few great families'. Writing at the time of

the Lancashire plug-plot riots, Hess thought he could now detect the final onset of ‘the approaching catastrophe’.⁸⁷ Engels arriving a few months later, believed the same.

It is noticeable that during the first fourteen months of his residence in England, Engels made no reference to an ‘industrial revolution’. Talk of competition, ‘the money aristocracy’ and the displacement of small capitalists by large was the common currency of radicals and socialists during the period. It did not entail a conception of industrialization. Even in an essay written for the Paris-based *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbucher* on Thomas Carlyle, no reference was made to an ‘industrial revolution’. Carlyle thought the crisis in ‘the condition of England’ was primarily the result of the loss of religious faith and the displacement of former feudal dependencies by the ‘cash nexus’.⁸⁸ Similarly, the first essay of the same journal to ascribe a revolutionary role to ‘the proletariat’, put forward its argument in terms made familiar by the preceding pauperism debate in Germany. Karl Marx, the author of the essay, defined ‘the proletariat’ as ‘a class of civil society, which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates’. Although this proletariat was coming into being ‘as a result of rising industrial development’, it was also claimed to be the result of ‘the drastic dissolution of society’.⁸⁹ What Marx at that point was describing was a social group outcast by the disintegration of estate society.

Engels’ first use of the term ‘industrial revolution’ occurred around February-March of 1844 in an essay, entitled, ‘The Condition of England.1. The Eighteenth Century’. It used to be thought that Engels might have taken the idea from Eugene Buret’s *De la misere des classes labourieuses en Angleterre et en France*. But, as Gustav Mayer argued long ago, this was very unlikely. Buret’s

work built upon Sismondi's approach from a Catholic perspective. There is no evidence that Engels read it.⁹⁰

In his account, Engels wrote of 'the invention of the steam engine and of machinery for working cotton' which 'gave rise, as is well known, to an industrial revolution'. But he also argued that 'the historical importance' of this revolution was 'only now beginning to be recognised'. Furthermore, the only sources mentioned – the 1844 edition of J.R. McCulloch's *Dictionary of Commerce* and G.R. Porter's *Progress of the Nation* (1836-1843) – made no reference to such a revolution. Engels' depiction of 'the industrial revolution' was straightforwardly functional.⁹¹ It is most likely that he read the account in Blanqui's *Histoire de l'economie politique en Europe*. Most striking in Engels' treatment of 'the industrial revolution', however, was that the idea was employed as his central explanatory concept, not only to account for Britain's industrial transformation, but also to account for all the phenomena formerly debated within the pauperism debate as well. But whatever Engels' source, 'the industrial revolution' almost immediately became his central explanatory concept, not only to account for Britain's industrial transformation, but also to account for all the phenomena formerly belonging to the pauperism debate as well.

This revolution through which British industry has passed is the foundation of every aspect of modern English life, the driving force behind all social development. Its first consequence was...the elevation of self interest to a position of dominance over man. Self interest seized the newly created industrial powers and exploited them for its own purposes; these powers, which by right belong to mankind, became owing to the influence of private property, the monopoly of a few rich capitalists and

the means to the enslavement of the masses. Commerce absorbed industry into itself and thereby became omnipotent, it became the nexus of mankind; all personal and national intercourse was reduced to commercial intercourse, and - which amounts to the same thing - property, things, became master of the world'.⁹²

There is no space to recount how these themes were elaborated in *The Condition of the working class in England* which was published in Leipzig in 1845.⁹³ Suffice it to say that all of England's recent history and problems, agricultural and political as well as industrial, were now emphatically attributed to 'the industrial revolution'. The point was most strongly made in the powerful and celebrated account of Manchester, for which the book is still chiefly remembered. Engels wrote of entering 'upon that classic soil on which English manufacture has achieved its masterwork and from which all labour movements emanate'. Manchester was the 'classic type of a modern manufacturing town', where 'the degradation to which the application of steam power, machinery and division of labour reduce the working man and the attempts of the proletariat to rise above this abasement must likewise be carried to the highest point'.⁹⁴

But a critical scrutiny of Engels' account of Manchester shows up the newly-stitched seams tying together 'the industrial revolution' with the preceding discussion of pauperism. For 'the most horrendous areas of Engels' Manchester lay close to the city centre, where factory work was not available and a casual labour market similar to that of inner Liverpool prevailed.'⁹⁵ It was a topic more closely related to anxieties about pauperization than to analyses of industrialization. Manchester's social problems were not solely, or even primarily, a product of factory work. They were specifically problems resulting

from rapid urbanization and population increase with the attendant pressures they imposed upon urban space, rents, water-supply and sanitary facilities. No one would deny that cotton had been the main agent in the growth of Manchester. But Manchester was not solely an industrial town, nor was it purely a creation of industrialization. Its population already exceeded 20,000 in 1750 - a sizeable number before either the technological changes of industrialization or the take-off of cotton manufacture.⁹⁶ Similarly its growth thereafter was as much a result of its position as a commercial centre as of the expansion of factory industry.

Like all commercial centres in the nineteenth century, Manchester became a magnet for casual labour, particularly in the multifarious and miscellaneous occupations servicing transport and storage - a market for day-labour that had been increasingly supplied by Irish migrants. From the 1820s onwards, this swelling number of unskilled, penniless and pauperised Irish peasants with no previous experience of urban life turned the centre of Manchester into the hell on earth which Engels depicted. Even making the most generous allowances, such a plight could not be taken to represent the condition of Manchester workers as a whole. It was crucial to Engels' argument that the condition of the modern proletariat be presented as singular and universal. But the apparent consistency of this argument was only sustained through surreptitious changes of character and scene at the back of the stage. For the attempt to present a single, undifferentiated, propertyless subject concealed what was in fact a shifting and differentiated set of actors playing different roles. While it may be true, as Engels claimed, that the 'labour movement' was born in great cities, it was certainly not born in the districts he described.⁹⁷

Critics of Engels' account have generally focussed upon the

exaggerations, the revolutionary optimism, the naive use of statistics, the one-sided impugning of middle class motivation or the occasional misquotation of sources. But this sort of scrutiny misses the distinctiveness of Engels' account. What really marked out Engels' book was its translation of overlapping but distinct themes - pauperism, the urban underclass and industrialization into facets of a single narrative. Themes from the German preoccupation with pauperism were incorporated within a French-based account of industrialization and made to form of a single (left Hegelian) story of the regeneration of mankind. When Engels' account was rediscovered forty years later, the Young Hegelian origins had been forgotten and expectations of regeneration had largely disappeared, but the single narrative remained.

To go back to Donald Coleman's original query, the origins of the catastrophist account of 'the industrial revolution' ought not to be ascribed to romanticism. They should rather be attributed to the coming together, conflation or synthesis of two areas of discourse about the social question which had largely arisen in the aftermath of the French Revolution and had until the 1830s and 1840s, remained relatively distinct.

1. See A. Kadish, *Apostle Arnold; the life and death of Arnold Toynbee 1852-1883*, NC 1986, ch.5, pp.98-155; D.C.Coleman, *Myth, history and the industrial revolution*, London 1992, ch.1, pp.1-43.

2. Say's discussion of the notion of 'revolutions d'industrie' became the basis of Blanqui's 'revolution industrielle' (J.A.Blanqui, *Histoire de l'economie politique en Europe depuis les anciens jusqu'a nos jours*, Paris 1837, ch.xxxviii). For the French origins of the notion of the 'industrial revolution', see G.Stedman Jones, *Industrie, pauperism and the Hanoverian state: the genesis and political context of the original debate about the "Industrial Revolution" in England and France, 1815-1840*, *The Centre for History and Economics*, 1997.

Still earlier use of the term has been discovered, notably in the diplomatic correspondence of Louis-Guillaume Otto in 1799; see D. Landes, 'The fable of the dead horse', in J. Mokyr(ed.), *The British industrial revolution: an economic perspective*, Boulder Co.1993, p.133. But there is no evidence that Otto's usage was taken up. See G .Stedman Jones, *Pauperism*, fn.6, p.45.

3. A.Toynbee, *Lectures on the industrial revolution in England*, London 1884, pp.85, 88, 92-93, 189.

4. D.C.Coleman, *Myth, history and the industrial revolution*, p.7.

5. In Germany, by the 1830s and 1840s, the term 'romantic' had a political meaning. It was associated with a nostalgia for feudalism and support for what the Young Hegelians called 'the Christian German State'. On contemporary radical German perceptions, see H.Heine, *Die romantische Schule*, 1833; for an English translation see H.Heine, *Travel Pictures, The Romantic School*, tr.F.Storr, London 1887.

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6. The period of Vormarx refers to the period before the March Revolution in Berlin in 1848. On the literature on pauperism, see W.Conze, 'Proletariat, Pobel, Pauperismus' in O.Brunner, W.Conze, R.Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Stuttgart 1984; H.Beck, *The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia*, Ann Arbor 1995.
 7. See E.Halevy, *History of the English people in the nineteenth century*, 6.vols, 1924-1948; E.P.Thompson, *The making of the English working class*, London 1963; J. Foster, *Class struggle and the industrial revolution, early industrial capitalism in three English towns*, London 1974.
 8. A. De Tocqueville, *Journeys to England and Ireland*, ed.J.P.Mayer, London 1958, p.68.
 9. K. Marx, 'Capital'(vol.1), in Karl Marx Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol.35, London 1996, p.8
 10. Cited in F.Crouzet, 'Les Francais et le "miracle" anglais', *L'Histoire*,no.28 November 1980, p.22.
 11. See A. Maddison, *Phases of capitalist development*, Oxford 1982, pp.44-5; F.Braudel & E.Labrousse, *Histoire economique et sociale de la France*, Paris 1970, vol.2, p.196; C.Heywood, *The development of the French economy 1750-1914*, London 1992, pp.14-15, 51-53.
 12. On the economic and technological gap which opened up between Britain and France between 1789 and 1815, see M.Levy-Leboyer, *Les Banques europeennes et l'industrialisation internationale dans la premiere moitie du XIX siecle*, Paris 1964, pp.23-30; F.Crouzet, *Britain ascendant: comparative studies in Franco-British economic history*, Cambridge 1990, pp.295-317. Some of the older ideas of a 'retardation' of the French economy in the nineteenth century

have, however, been successfully challenged. See P.O'Brien & C.Keyder, *Economic growth in Britain and France 1780-1914*, London 1978.

13. Cited in F.Acomb, *Anglophobia in France 1763-1789*, Durham N.C. 1950, p.121.

14. See N.Hampson, *The perfidy of Albion*, London 1998, pp.162-164.

15. Tocqueville was one of the few who attempted to arrive at a more balanced picture, but most of his observations remained unpublished. See J. P. Mayer(ed.), A.de Tocqueville, *Journeys to England & Ireland*, London 1957.

16. F.Bedarida (ed.), Flora Tristan, *Promenades dans Londres ou l'aristocratie et les proletaires anglais*, Paris 1978, pp.65-66; and see the excellent introduction by Francois Bedarida, pp.11-43; there is also an English translation.see *Flora Tristan's London journal*, tr.D.Palmer & G.Pinceti, London 1980, p.1.

17. A.Ledru-Rollin, *De la decadence de l'Angleterre*, Paris 1850, vol.11,p.108

18. B.Constant, *Commentaire sur l'ouvrage de Filangieri*, Paris 1822, pt.1 ch.xii

19. Stendhal, *Souvenirs d'egotisme*, ch.vi; *L'Italie en 1818*, 30 October 1818.

20. E.Hyams (ed.& tr.), *Taine's Notes on England*,(1860-1870), London 1957, pp.13, 290-293

21. See for example A.de Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Economie politique chretienne*, 3 vols, Paris 1834. this line of criticism was developed most strongly in J.C.L.Simonde de Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes d'economie politique ou de la richesse dans ses rapport avec la population*, 2 vols, Paris 1819. Sismondi's concerns, however, were not legitimist but republican. He was an enthusiastic historian of the Italian city states.

Anxieties about the effect of machinery upon employment were not new. They had been expressed by Dangeul in the middle of the eighteenth century; see

Emma Rothschild, pp. ?? above.

22. The relevant discussion in Smith is found in *Wealth of nations*, I, book 2, ch. 5, p.364.

23.H. Gouhier, *La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la formation de Positivisme*, Paris, 1970, III, ch.2; E. Alix, 'J. B. Say et les origines de l'industrialisme', *Revue d'économie politique* (1910). See S. M. Gruner, 'Political historiography in Restoration France', *History and Theory* (1972), pp. 346-65; M. James, 'Pierre-Louis Roederer, Jean Baptiste Say and the concept of *industrie*', *History of Political Economy* 9(1977), pp. 455-75; T. Kaiser, 'Politics and political economy in the thought of the idéologues', *History of Political Economy* 12 (1980), pp. 142-59; C. B. Welch, *Liberty and utility. the French idéologues and the transformation of liberalism*, New York, 1984, ch. 3.

24. E. J. Sieyès, *What is the third estate?*, London, 1983.

25. On the eighteenth century discussion of 'doux commerce' see A. Hirschman, *The passions and the interests; political arguments for capitalism before its triumph*, Princeton (NJ), 1977.

26. There is a brief chapter arguing the merits of machines both for 'la classe ouvrière' and even more for consumers. It was stated that many more hands were employed in cotton manufacture in England, France and Germany since the introduction, just as in printing, *Ibid*, I, ch. 7, pp. 52-61. Say was to elaborate these arguments in the *Cours complet*, as the argument about machinery grew more intense, see below. The invention of printing, as Say pointed out, had resulted in the employment of numbers unimaginable in the days of manuscript. I argue that the first debate about the 'industrial revolution' took place in France in the 1820s, the phrase - 'revolution d'industrie', being introduced by Say and

popularised by his follower, Adolphe Blanqui. See G.Stedman Jones, *Industrie, pauperism and the Hanoverian State*

27. J. B. Say, *England and the English people*, second edn., trans. J. Richter, London, 1816.

28. *Ibid*, p. 14.

29. *Ibid*, p. 21.

30. *Ibid*, pp. 26,29-30,30-32.

31. *Ibid*, pp.35,36,37-8.

32. *Ibid*, p. 38.

33. *Ibid*, p. 39.

34. *Ibid*, p. 43.

35. *Ibid*, pp. 65-6.

36. *Ibid*, pp. 63-5.

37. *Ibid*, p. 62.

38. E.A.Wrigley & R.Schofield, *The population history of England, 1541-1871*, Cambridge 1981, ch.10.

39. J.C.L.Simonde de Sismondi, *Histoire des republiques italiennes du moyen age*, 16 vols, Paris 1807-1824.

40. *Nouveaux Principes*,(1827 edition), vol.1, p.45.

41. J.B.Say, *Cours complet d'economie politique pratique*, 6 vols, Paris 1828, p.398.

42. J.A.Blanqui, *Histoire de l'economie politique en Europe depuis les anciens jusqu'a nos jours*, 2 vols, Paris 1837, vol.2, p.267, p.214.

43. On the political and intellectual significance of the Gottingen historians, see C.E.McClelland, *The German historians and England*, Cambridge 1971, part 1.

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44. see J.Droz, *L'Allemagne et la revolution francaise*, Paris 1949.
45. See F.C.Beiser, *Enlightenment, revolution and romanticism*, Cambridge Mass, 1992, pp.302-309.
46. See L.Dickey (ed.), G.W.F.Hegel, *Political writings*, Cambridge 1999, p.xiv.
47. Cited in C.E.McClelland, *The German Historians*, p.42.
48. See Emma Rothschild, 'Smithianismus and enlightenment in nineteenth-century Europe', *Centre for History and Economics*, Cambridge 1998.
49. Cited in McClelland, *op.cit.* p.47.
50. G.W.F.Hegel, *Lectures on natural right and political science*, tr. J.M.Stewart & P.C.Hodgson, Berkeley 1996, p.288.
51. See M.Petry, 'Hegel and the "Morning Chronicle"', *Hegel Studien*, vol.xi, 1976, pp.11-80; N.Waszek, 'Miszelle: Hegels Schottische Bettler', *Hegel Studien*, vol.xix, 1984, pp.311-317; N.Waszek, 'Hegels exzerpte aus der "Edinburgh Review"', *Hegel Studien*, vol.xx, 1985, pp.79-112; N.Waszek, 'Hegels exzerpte aus der "Quarterly Review" 1817-1818', *Hegel Studien*, vol.xxi, 1986, pp.9-25. But see also F.Hogemann, 'Zur Frage der Quellen von Hegels Reformbill-Aufsatz', *Hegel-Studien*, vol.xxxiv, 1999, pp.11-37, where it is maintained that Hegel's major source for his Reform Bill essay was the *Allgemeine Preussische Staats-Zeitung*, in which his own essay was published.
52. G.W.F.Hegel, *Lectures on natural right* p.177
53. D.Henrich (ed.), G.W.F.Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819-1820 in einer Nachschrift*, Frankfurt/amM., 1983, p.193; for an English translation of this passage, see S.Avinieri, 'The Discovery of Hegel's early Lectures on the Philosophy of Right', *Owl of Minerva*, 16, 2, (Spring 1985), p.206.

The point about machinery benefitting large capitalists at the expense of small was emphasised by Sismondi.

54. A.W.Wood (ed.), G.W.F.Hegel, *Elements of the philosophy of right*, Cambridge 1991, p.227.

55. K.H.Ilting (ed.), G.W.F.Hegel, *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie 1818-1831*, 4 vols, Stuttgart 1974, vol.3, p.613.

56. *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie*, vol.4, p.503.

57. G.W.F.Hegel, 'Lectures on the Philosophy of History', in L.Dickey (ed.), *Hegel's political writings*, p.222.

58. *Ibid.*, pp.238-239.

59. *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie 1818-1831*, vol.4, p.625.

60. *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie*, vol.3, p.711.

33. *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie*, vol.4, pp.626-7.

62. See G.Stedman Jones, 'Hegel and the economics of civil society', in S.Kaviraj & S.Khilnani (eds.), *Civil society: history and possibilities*, Cambridge 2001, pp.105-131. This essay, however, does not sufficiently emphasise Hegel's shift of position around 1819.

63. *Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie*, vol.4, p.503

64. *Philosophy of right*, para 240, p.264.

65. *Lectures on natural right* para 118, p.209.

66. *Ibid.*, III, p.704.

67. *Philosophy of right* p.267.

68. Dickey's analysis of this text in his introduction to *Hegel's political writings*, see pp.xiv-xviii, represents a welcome change of assessment. Traditionally, this text was dismissed as strange or even evidence of an intellectual decline, partly

because its emphasis upon the unfortunate consequences of the weakness of the monarch, and partly because its anxiety that 1832 could become another 1789, seemed far-fetched. But however unfamiliar (to post-Bagehotian English preconceptions) Hegel's identification of monarchy and rationality were, they were also perfectly cogent. On the question whether Hegel exaggerated the possibility of an English revolution, it is important to bear in mind that Hegel's main English source, *The Morning Chronicle*, was a Benthamite newspaper edited by John Black, a close friend of James Mill. It was the policy of the paper to frighten Parliament into reform by playing on revolutionary fears. See M. J. Petry, 'Propaganda and analysis: the background to Hegel's article on the English Reform Bill', in Z.A.Pelczynski (ed.), *The state and civil society: studies in Hegel's political philosophy*, Cambridge 1984, pp.137-159.

69. 'On the English Reform Bill', *loc.cit.* p.248

70. *ibid.* p.264.

71. *Ibid.*p.236.

72. *Ibid.* p.251.

73. *Ibid.* p.239

74. *Ibid.* p.247. It is unclear what Hegel meant by the term 'disqualified'. There was no legal limitation on the purchase of land.

75. *Ibid.* pp. 239, 269

76. *Ibid.* p.250

77. *Ibid.* p.269.

78. *Ibid.* p.248

79. *Ibid.* p.265

80. *Philosophy of right*, p.266 para 244. Hegel's fears were not so far-fetched:

1831 was the year of the Captain Swing riots throughout the Southern and Eastern agricultural counties.

81. 'On the English Reform Bill', p.270.

82. F.Engels, 'The English view of the internal Crises', *Karl Marx Frederick Engels Works*, vol.2, pp.370-371.

83. *Ibid.* pp.371-372.

84. F.Engels,'The Condition of the Working Class in England', *Works*, vol.2, pp.378-379.

85. For the view that it was, see S. Marcus, *Engels, Manchester and the working class*, London 1974.

86. F.Engels, 'Landscapes' in *Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works*, vol.2, p.100

87. M.Hess, 'Die europaische Triarchie',in W.Monke, *Moses Hess:Philosophische und Sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850*, Vaduz 1980, pp.159-160; M.Hess,' Uber eine in England bevorstehende Katastrophe', (Rheinische Zeitung, no.177, 26,June 1842) in *Ibid*,pp.183-185.

88. F. Engels, 'The Condition of England'. *Past and Present* by Thomas Carlyle, London 1843', *Works*, vol.3, pp.444-469.

89. K. Marx,'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction', in Marx Engels *Collected Works*, vol.3, pp.186-187.

90. See E.Buret, *De la misere des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France*, Paris 2 vols, 1840; G.Mayer, *Friedrich Engels Eine Biographie*, 2 vols, Koln (repr.1969) vol.1, p.195. There is also no evidence at this point that Engels had read Sismondi.

91. F. Engels, 'The condition of the working class in England' in Karl Marx

Friedrich Engels Collected Works, vol. 4, p.307, pp.307-323

92. F.Engels,'The Condition of England.1.The Eighteenth Century',in *Karl Marx Frederick Engels Works*, vol.3, p.485.

93. I discuss how Young Hegelian and Feuerbachian themes shape the narrative of *The Condition of the Working Class in England* in G.Stedman Jones,'Voir sans entendre, Engels, Manchester et l'observation sociale en 1844', *Geneses* 22, March 1996, pp.4-17.

⁹⁴ F.Engels,'The condition of the working class in England', Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, vol.4, pp.344-345.

⁹⁵ In *The Cambridge social history of Britain*, ed. F.M.L. Thompson, I, pp. 371-2.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 27.

⁹⁷ Karl Marx Frederick Engels *Collected works*, vol.4.p.360; this conflation of the outlook of workers employed in modern industry and that of those displaced from the land, uprooted casual labourers or the urban unemployed, continued in the description Marx and Engels gave of 'the proletariat' in *The communist manifesto*. See G. Stedman Jones, (ed.), *The communist manifesto*, Harmondsworth, 2002, 'Introduction' section 3 on 'the spectre of communism'.